A Dutch court has ruled on appeal in the summary proceedings brought by Privacy First concerning the Ultimate Beneficial Owners (UBO) register. Like the preliminary relief court, the Court of Appeal of The Hague unfortunately rejected Privacy First’s claims.

The court in preliminary relief proceedings earlier confirmed that there is every reason to doubt the legal validity of the European money laundering directives that form the basis for the UBO register. The judge ruled that it cannot be precluded that the highest European court, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), will conclude that the public nature of the UBO register is not in line with the principle of proportionality. The ruling of the CJEU is expected in mid-2022.

Existing legal entities in the Netherlands do not have to register their UBOs until 27 March 2022. This is different for new legal entities: these have to register their UBOs immediately. The Court of Appeal of The Hague deems it unlikely that these UBOs will suffer serious damage in the short term and points out that UBOs fearing to be at risk from the disclosure of personal data can immediately shield these data from the general public. Dutch law provides for this possibility. The Hague Court of Appeal called this ‘a simple way to prevent UBO data from becoming or remaining public’. UBOs can apply to the Trade Register for shielding. As long as such applications are pending, UBO data will actually be protected. Now that the Court of Appeal has so emphatically pointed out this possibility, it is expected that many UBOs will follow this route.

‘The solution must come from the highest European court, the Court of Justice of the EU’, comments Privacy First’s attorney, Otto Volgenant of Boekx Attorneys. ‘It will rule on this in mid-2022. I expect that the Court will mark the end of the open nature of the UBO register. Thus far hardly any data have been entered into the register and I advise everyone to just wait as long as possible. The Dutch government has arbitrarily chosen a date by which UBOs must provide their data, namely 27 March 2022. It would be wise to postpone that end date by a few months until after the CJEU has provided clarity. That would prevent a lot of trouble and unnecessary costs.’

The judgment (in Dutch) of the district court in preliminary relief proceedings can be found here:
http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:2457  
while the judgment (in Dutch) of the Court of Appeal can be found here:
http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2021:2176.

Published in Litigation

Despite an urgent call by Privacy First to the Dutch House of Representatives to block the coronavirus entry pass, the introduction of this pass throughout The Netherlands as of 25 September 2021 unfortunately seems to be a reality. Privacy First expects that this will lead to division of Dutch society, exclusion of vulnerable groups, discrimination and violation of everyone’s right to privacy. Moreover, the introduction of this pass leads to vaccination coercion, which violates everyone’s right to dispose freely of their own body. This is incompatible with the right to physical integrity and self-determination and fuels the undermining of our trust in the democratic rule of law, in which these fundamental rights are enshrined.

With massive encroachment and violation of human rights looming, it is up to the courts to intervene and correct the government. In line with our statutory objective to take action in the public interest, the current lawsuit by Dutch attorney Bart Maes and others to stop the coronavirus entry pass therefore has our full support. Privacy First would like to emphasize that this is not a statement against vaccination (on the contrary), but that it is crucial to fully respect and protect everyone’s human rights, especially in these times. Critical voices should be taken seriously and not be dismissed on emotional grounds. In both the short and the long term, this is the best guarantee for an open, free and healthy society.

Published in Law & Politics

Today, Privacy First sent the following plea to the Dutch House of Representatives: 

Dear Members of Parliament, 

It is with great disapproval that the Privacy First Foundation has taken note of the planned introduction of coronavirus entry passes for bars and restaurants, events and cultural institutions. This will lead to a division in society, exclusion of vulnerable groups and a massive violation of everyone’s right to privacy. Below, Privacy First will briefly explain this.

Serious violation of fundamental rights

The coronavirus entry pass (‘corona pass’) constitutes a serious infringement of numerous fundamental human rights, including the right to privacy, physical self-determination, bodily integrity and freedom of movement in conjunction with other classic human rights such as the right to participate in cultural life and various children’s rights such as the right to recreation. Any curtailment of these rights must be strictly necessary, proportionate and effective. In the case of the corona pass, however, this has not been demonstrated to date and the required necessity is simply being assumed in the public interest. More privacy-friendly alternatives to reopen and normalize society seem never to have been seriously considered. For these reasons alone, the corona pass cannot pass the human rights test and should therefore be repealed. In this context, Privacy First would also like to remind you of countries such as England, Belgium and Denmark where a similar pass was deliberately not introduced, or has been done way with not long after its introduction. In the Netherlands, there has been a great lack of support in recent days for the corona pas and many thousands of entrepreneurs have already let it be known that they will not cooperate. Privacy First therefore expects that the introduction of the corona pass will lead to massive civil disobedience and successful lawsuits against the Dutch government.

Social exclusion

The introduction of the corona pass violates the general prohibition of discrimination, as it introduces a broad social distinction based on medical status. This puts a strain on social life and may lead to widespread inequality, stigmatization, social segregation and even possible tensions, as large groups in society will not (or not systematically) want to, or will not be able to get tested or vaccinated (for a variety of reasons), or obtain a digital test or vaccination certificate. During our National Privacy Conference in early 2021, Privacy First already took the position that the introduction of a mandatory ‘corona passport’ would have a socially disruptive effect.[1] On that occasion, the Dutch Data Protection Authority, among others, explicitly took a stand against the introduction of such a passport. The aforementioned social risks apply all the more strongly to the vaccination coercion that is caused by the introduction of the corona pass. In this regard, Privacy First would like to remind you of the fact that both your House of Representatives and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have expressed their opposition to a direct or indirect vaccination requirement.[2] In addition, the corona pass will have the potential to set precedent for other medical conditions and other sectors of society, putting pressure on a much wider range of socio-economic human rights. For these reasons, Privacy First calls on you to block the introduction of the corona pass.

Multiple privacy violations

From the perspective of the right to privacy, there are a number of yet other specific concerns and questions. First of all, the corona pass introduces a mandatory ‘health proof’ for participation in a large part of social life, in flagrant violation of the right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Through the mandatory display of an ID card in addition to the corona pass, an entirely new identification requirement is created in public places. The existing anonymity in the public space is thus removed, with all the dangers and risks that this entails. Moreover, this new identification requirement raises questions about the capacities of entrepreneurs to determine the identity of a person and to assess the state of health by means of the corona pass.

Moreover, the underlying legislation results in the inconsistent application of existing legislation with regard to the same act, i.e. testing, with far-reaching consequences on the one hand for an important attainment such as medical confidentiality and the public’s trust in that confidentiality, and on the other for the practical implementation of retention periods of the test results while the processing of these results does not change. After all, it is not the result of the test that should determine whether the registration of the testing falls under the Dutch Medical Treatment Agreement Act (‘Wgbo’, which requires medical confidentiality and a 20-year retention period) or the Dutch Public Health Act (‘Wpg’, which requires a 5-year retention period), but the act of testing itself. Besides, it is questionable why a connection was sought with the Wpg and/or Wgbo now that it is about obtaining a certificate for participation in society and it does not concern medical treatment (Wgbo) or public health tasks for that purpose. The only ground for processing personal data for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the coronavirus and for breaching medical confidentiality, should be consent. However, in this case there cannot be the legally required freely given consent, since testing and vaccination will be a mandatory condition for participation in society.

Privacy requires clarity

Many other things are and remain unclear: what data will be stored, where, by whom and in which systems? To what extent will there be an international and European exchange of such data? Which parties with which purposes will have access to or will copy the data, or put these in huge new national databases together with our health data? Will we have constant personal localization and identification, or only occasional verification and authentication? Why can test results be kept for an unnecessarily long time? How great are the risks of hacking, data breaches, fraud and forgery? To what extent have decentralized, privacy-friendly technologies and privacy by design, open source software, data minimization and anonymization seriously been considered? How long will test certificates remain free of charge? Is work already underway to introduce an ‘alternative digital medium’ to the Dutch CoronaCheck app, namely a chip (card), with all the objections and risks that entails? Why has there been no independent Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)? How many more times must the country accept emergency laws to close privacy leaks, when our overburdened and understaffed Data Protection Authority is already noting that there is no legal basis for the processing of the data concerned? How will unforeseen uses and abuses, function creep and profiling be prevented, and how is privacy oversight arranged? Will non-digital, paper alternatives remain available at all times? Why is the ‘yellow booklet’ not accepted as a privacy-friendly alternative, as it is in other countries? What happens with the test material – i.e. everyone’s DNA – at the various testing sites? And when will the corona pass be abolished? In other words, to what extent is this actually a ‘temporary’ measure?

In the view of Privacy First, the introduction of the corona pass will lead merely to an impractical burden on entrepreneurs, innumerable deficiencies and destruction of capital for society. Privacy First therefore requests that the members of the House of Representatives block the introduction of the corona pass. Failing to do so, Privacy First reserves the right to have the legislation introducing the corona pass reviewed against international and European law and declared inoperative by the courts. Preparations for such legal proceedings by us and many others are already underway.

Yours sincerely,

Privacy First Foundation 

[1] See National Privacy Conference 28 January 2021, https://youtu.be/asEX1jy4Tv0?t=9378, starting at 2h 36 min 18 sec.
[2] See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2361 (2021): Covid-19 vaccines: ethical, legal and practical considerations, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/29004/html, par. 7.3.1-7.3.2: ‘‘Ensure that citizens are informed that the vaccination is NOT mandatory and that no one is politically, socially, or otherwise pressured to get themselves vaccinated, if they do not wish to do so themselves; ensure that no one is discriminated against for not having been vaccinated, due to possible health risks or not wanting to be vaccinated.’’ See also, inter alia, Dutch House of Representatives, Motion by Member Azarkan on no corona vaccination requirement (28 October 2020), House of Representatives, 25295-676, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-676.html: ‘‘The House of Representatives (...) expresses that there should never be a direct or indirect corona vaccination obligation in the future’’; Motion by Member Azarkan on access to public benefits for all regardless of vaccination or testing status (5 January 2021), House of Representatives 25295-864, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-864.html: "The House of Representatives (...) requests the government to allow access to public benefits for all regardless of vaccination or testing status."


An earlier, similar version of this commentary appeared as early as March 2021: https://www.privacyfirst.eu/focus-areas/law-and-politics/695-privacy-first-position-concerning-the-dutch-draft-bill-on-covid-19-test-certificates.html.

Published in Law & Politics

The hearing at the court of appeal in The Hague in the proceedings of Privacy First against the register for Ultimate Beneficial Owners (UBO) is scheduled for Monday, 27 September 2021.

Following the very critical advice of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the district court of The Hague confirmed on 18 March 2021 that there is every reason to doubt the validity of the European money laundering directives that form the basis for the UBO register. The judge ruled that it cannot be excluded that the highest European court, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), will conclude that the public nature of the UBO register is not in line with the principle of proportionality. Since a Luxembourg local court has already refered questions about this to the CJEU, the Dutch court in summary proceedings did not find it necessary to ask questions about it as well. Privacy First has appealed the judgment in these summary proceedings, taking the case to the court of appeal of The Hague. Our appeal summons can be found here (pdf in Dutch).

Privacy First requests the court of appeal to ask preliminary questions on the UBO register to the European Court of Justice and calls for the suspension of the operation of the UBO register until these questions have been answered. Privacy First also asks the court to temporarily suspend the public accessibility of the UBO register, at least until the CJEU has ruled on this matter. The court of appeal's ruling is expected a few weeks after the hearing on 27 September 2021.

‘‘The UBO register will put privacy-sensitive data of millions of people up for grabs’’, Privacy First’s attorney Otto Volgenant of Boekx Attorneys comments. ‘‘There are doubts from all sides whether this is an effective tool in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. It’s like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. The Court of Justice of the EU will ultimately rule on this. I expect that it will annul the UBO register – at least its public accessibility. Until then, I advise UBOs not to submit any data to the UBO register. Once data have been made public, they cannot be retrieved.’’

Background of the lawsuit against the UBO register

Privacy First is bringing a lawsuit against the Dutch government regarding the UBO Register which was introduced in 2020. In summary proceedings, the invalidity of the EU regulations on which the UBO register is based are being invoked. The consequences of this new legislation are far-reaching. After all, it concerns very privacy-sensitive information. Data about the financial situation of natural persons will be out in the open. More than 1.5 million legal entities in the Netherlands that are listed in the Dutch Trade Register will have to disclose information about their ultimate beneficial owners. The UBO register is accessible to everyone, for €2.50 per retrieval. This level of public accessibility is not proportionate.

On 24 June 2020, the Dutch ‘Implementation Act on Registration of Ultimate Beneficial Owners of Companies and Other Legal Entities’ entered into force. Based on this new Act, a new UBO register linked to the Trade Register of the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce will contain information on all ultimate beneficial owners of companies and other legal entities incorporated in the Netherlands. This information must indicate the interest of the UBO, i.e. 25-50%, 50-75% or more than 75%. In any case, the UBO’s name, month and year of birth as well as nationality will be publicly available for everyone to consult, with all the privacy risks this entails.

Since 27 September 2020, newly established entities must register their UBO in the UBO Register. Existing legal entities have until March 27 2022 to register their UBOs. The law gives only very limited options for shielding information. This is only possible for persons secured by the police, for minors and for those under guardianship. The result will be that the interests of almost all UBOs will become public knowledge.

European Anti-Money Laundering Directive

This new law stems from the Fifth European Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which requires EU Member States to register and disclose to the public the personal data of UBOs. The aim of this is to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. According to the European legislator, the registration and subsequent disclosure of personal data of UBOs, including the interest that the UBO has in a company, contributes to that objective. The public nature of the register would have a deterrent effect on persons wishing to launder money or finance terrorism. But the effectiveness of a UBO register in the fight against money laundering and terrorism has never been substantiated.

Massive privacy violation and fundamental criticism

The question is whether the means does not defeat the purpose. Registering the personal data of all UBOs and making it accessible to everyone is a blanket measure of a preventive nature. 99.99% of all UBOs have nothing to do with money laundering or terrorist financing. If it was in fact proportionate to collect information on UBOs, it should be sufficient if that information is available to those government agencies involved in combating money laundering and terrorism. Making the information completely public is going too far. The European Data Protection Supervisor already ruled that this privacy violation is not proportionate. But this opinion has not led to an amendment of the European directive.

Leading up to the the debate on this law in the Dutch House of Representatives, fundamental criticism came from various quarters. The business community agitated because it feared – and now experiences – an increase in burdens and perceives privacy risks. UBOs of family-owned companies that have remained out of the public eye up until now are running major privacy and security risks. There was also a great deal of attention for the position of parties that attach great importance to the protection of data subjects, such as church communities and social organizations. As for associations and foundations that do not have owners, things are cumbersome: they have to put the data that is already in the Trade Register in another register. Unfortunately, this has not led to any changes in the regulations.

Dutch investigative journalism platform Follow the Money looked into the social costs of the Dutch UBO register. Follow the Money writes: ‘‘The UBO register entails costs, hassle and sometimes slightly absurd bureaucracy for millions of entrepreneurs and directors. The Ministry of Finance reckons the total costs of the register for the business community is 99 million Euros. Another 9 million Euros must be added for one-time implementation costs. When lawyer Volgenant hears about this amount, he reacts with dismay: 'The total costs are much higher than I thought! If you extrapolate that to the whole EU, the costs are astronomical.’’’

Favourable outcome of lawsuit is likely

Privacy First has initiated a lawsuit against the UBO register for violation of the fundamental right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Privacy First requests the Dutch judiciary to render the UBO register inoperative in the short term and to submit preliminary questions on this subject to the Court of Justice of the European Union. It would not be the first time privacy-violating regulations are repealed by the courts, something that previous Privacy First lawsuits attest to.

The Dutch law and also the underlying European directive are in conflict with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as the General Data Protection Regulation. The legislator has created these regulations, but it is up to the courts to conduct a thorough review of them. Ultimately the judge will have the final say. If the (European) legislator does not pay enough attention to the protection of fundamental rights, then the (European) judge can cast the regulations aside. The Court of Justice of the European Union has previously declared regulations invalid due to privacy violations, for example the Telecom Data Protection Directive and the Privacy Shield. The Dutch courts also regularly invalidate privacy-invading regulations. Privacy First has previously successfully challenged the validity of legislation, for example in the proceedings about the Telecommunications Data Retention Act and in the proceedings against SyRI. Viewed against this background, the lawsuit against the UBO register is considered very promising.

Update 27 September 2021: this afternoon the court session took place in The Hague; click HERE for the pleading of our lawyer (pdf in Dutch). The judgment of the court of appeal is scheduled for 16 November 2021.

Do you have any questions? Please contact us or our attorney Otto Volgenant of Boekx Attorneys. Privacy First can use your help and would appreciate it if you would become a donor.

Published in Litigation

As an NGO that promotes civil rights and privacy protection, Privacy First has been concerned with financial privacy for years. Since 2017, we have been keeping close track of the developments surrounding the second European Payment Services Directive (PSD2), pointing out the dangers to the privacy of consumers. In particular, we focus on privacy issues related to ‘account information service providers’ (AISPs) and on the dangerous possibilities offered by PSD2 to process personal data in more extensive ways.

At the end of 2017, we assumed that providing more adequate information and more transparency to consumers would be sufficient to mitigate the risks associated with PSD2. However, these risks turned out to be greater and of a more fundamental nature. We therefore decided to launch a bilingual (Dutch & English) website called PSD2meniet.nl in order to outline both our concerns and our solutions with regard to PSD2.

Central to our project is the Don’t-PSD2-Me-Register, an idea we launched on 7 January 2019 in the Dutch television program Radar and in this press release. The aim of the Don’t-PSD2-Me-Register is to provide a real tool to consumers with which they can filter out and thus protect their personal data. In time, more options to filter out and restrict the use of data should become available. With this project, Privacy First aims to contribute to positive improvements to PSD2 and its implementation.

Protection of special personal data

In this project, which is supported by the SIDN Fund, Privacy First has focused particularly on ‘special personal data’, such as those generated through payments made to trade unions, political parties, religious organizations, LGBT advocacy groups or medical service providers. Payments made to the Dutch Central Judicial Collection Agency equally reveal parts of people’s lives that require extra protection. These special personal data directly touch upon the issue of fundamental human rights. When consumers use AISPs under PSD2, their data can be shared more widely among third parties. PSD2 indirectly allows data that are currently protected, to become widely known, for example by being included in consumer profiles or black lists.

The best form of protection is to prevent special personal data from getting processed in the first place. That is why we have built the Don’t-PSD2-Me-Register, with an Application Programming Interface (API) – essentially a privacy filter – wrapped around it. With this filter, AISPs can detect and filter out account numbers and thus prevent special personal data from being unnecessarily processed or provided to third parties. Moreover, the register informs consumers and gives them a genuine choice as to whether or not they wish to share their data.

What’s next?

We have outlined many of the results we have achieved in a Whitepaper, which has been sent to stakeholders such as the European Commission, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the Dutch Data Protection Authority. And of course, to as many AISPs as possible, because if they decide to adopt the measures we propose, they would be protecting privacy by design. Our Whitepaper contains a number of examples and good practices on how to enhance privacy protection. Among other things, it lays out how to improve the transparency of account information services. We hope that AISPs will take the recommendations in our Whitepaper to heart.

Our Application Programming Interface (API) has already been adopted by a service provider called Gatekeeper for Open Banking. We support this start up’s continued development, and we make suggestions on how the privacy filter can be best incorporated into their design and services. When AISPs use Gatekeeper, consumers get the control over their data that they deserve.

Knowing that the European Commission will not be evaluating PSD2 until 2022, we are glad to have been able to convey our own thoughts through our Whitepaper. Along with the API we have developed and distributed, it is an important tool for any AISP that takes the privacy of its consumers seriously.

Privacy First will continue to monitor all developments related to the second Payment Services Directive. Our website PSD2meniet.nl will remain up and running and will continue to be the must-visit platform for any updates on this topic.

If you want to know how things develop, or in case you have any suggestions, please send an email to Martijn van der Veen: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

It is with great concern that Privacy First has taken note of the Dutch draft bill on COVID-19 test certificates. Under this bill, a negative COVID-19 test certificate will become mandatory for access to sporting and youth activities, all sorts of events and public places including bars and restaurants and cultural and higher education institutions, Those who have no such certificates risk getting high fines. This will put pressure on everyone's right to privacy. 

Serious violation of fundamental rights

The draft bill severely infringes numerous fundamental and human rights, including the right to privacy, physical integrity and freedom of movement in combination with other relevant human rights such as the right to participate in cultural life, the right to education and various children’s rights such as the right to recreation. Any curtailment of these rights must be strictly necessary, proportionate and effective. However, the current draft bill fails to demonstrate this, while the required necessity in the public interest is simply assumed. More privacy-friendly alternatives to reopen and normalize society do not seem to have been considered. For these reasons alone, the proposal cannot pass the human rights test and should therefore be withdrawn.

Social exclusion

The proposal also violates the general prohibition of discrimination, as it introduces a broad social distinction based on medical status. This puts pressure on social life and may lead to large-scale inequality, stigmatization, social segregation and even possible tensions, as large groups in society will not (or not systematically) want to or will not be able to get tested (for various reasons). During the recent Dutch National Privacy Conference organized by Privacy First and the Platform for the Information Society (ECP), it already became clear that the introduction of a mandatory ‘corona passport’ could have a socially disruptive effect.[1] On that occasion the Dutch Data Protection Authority, among others, took a strong stand against it. Such social risks apply all the more strongly to the indirect vaccination obligation that follows on from the corona test certificate. In this regard, Privacy First wants to recall that recently both the Dutch House of Representatives and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have expressed their opposition to a direct or indirect vaccination requirement.[2] In addition, the draft bill under consideration will have the potential to set precedents for other medical conditions and other sectors of society, putting pressure on a much broader range of socio-economic rights. For all of these reasons, Privacy First strongly recommends that the Dutch government withdraw this draft bill.

Multiple privacy violations

Moreover, from the perspective of the right to privacy, a number of specific objections and questions apply. First of all, the draft bill introduces a mandatory ‘proof of healthiness’ for participation in a large part of social life, in flagrant violation of the right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Also, the draft bill introduces an identification requirement at the entrance of public places, in violation of the right to anonymity in public spaces. The bill also results in the inconsistent application of existing legislation to the same act, namely testing, with far-reaching consequences on the one hand for a precious achievement like medical confidentiality and the trust of citizens in that confidentiality, and on the other hand for the practical implementation of retention periods while the processing of the test result does not change. After all, it is not the result of the test that should determine whether the file falls under the Dutch Medical Treatment Contracts Act (WGBO, which has a medical secrecy requirement and a retention period of 20 years) or under the Public Health Act (with a retention period of five years), but the act of testing itself. Moreover, it is unclear why the current draft bill seeks to connect to the Public Health Act and/or WGBO if it only concerns obtaining a test certificate for the purpose of participating in society (and therefore no medical treatment or public health task for that purpose). Here, the only possibility for processing and for breaching medical confidentiality should be the basis of consent. In this case, however, there cannot be the legally required freely given consent, since testing will be a compelling condition for participation in society.

Privacy requires clarity

Many other issues are still unclear: which data will be stored, where, by whom, and which data may possibly be exchanged? To what extent will there be personal localization and identification as opposed to occasional verification and authentication? Why may test results be kept for an unnecessarily long time (five or even 20 years)? How great are the risks of hacking, data breaches, fraud and forgery? To what extent will there be decentralized, privacy-friendly technology, privacy by design, open source software, data minimization and anonymization? Will test certificates remain free of charge and to what extent will privacy-friendly diversity and choice in testing applications be possible? Is work already underway to introduce an ‘alternative digital carrier’ in place of the Dutch CoronaCheck app, namely a chip, with all the risks that entails? How will function creep and profiling be prevented and are there any arrangements when it comes to data protection supervision? Will non-digital, paper alternatives always remain available? What will happen to the test material taken, i.e. everyone’s DNA? And when will the corona test certificates be abolished?

As long as such concerns and questions remain unanswered, submission of this bill makes no sense at all and the corona test certificate will only lead to the destruction of social capital. Privacy First therefore reiterates its request that the current proposal be withdrawn and not submitted to Parliament. Failing this, Privacy First will reserve the right to have the matter reviewed by the courts and declared unlawful.

[1] See the Dutch National Privacy Conference, 28 January 2021, https://youtu.be/asEX1jy4Tv0?t=9378, starting at 2h 36 min 18 sec.
[2] See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2361 (2021): Covid-19 vaccines: ethical, legal and practical considerations, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/29004/html, par. 7.3.1-7.3.2: “Ensure that citizens are informed that the vaccination is NOT mandatory and that no one is politically, socially, or otherwise pressured to get themselves vaccinated, if they do not wish to do so themselves; ensure that no one is discriminated against for not having been vaccinated, due to possible health risks or not wanting to be vaccinated.” See also, for example, Dutch House of Representatives, Motion by Member Azarkan on No Corona Vaccination Obligation (28 October 2020), Parliamentary Document 25295-676, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-676.html: "The House (...) pronounces that there should never be a direct or indirect coronavirus vaccination obligation in the future"; Motion by Member Azarkan on Access to Public Benefits for All Regardless of Vaccination or Testing Status (5 January 2021), Parliamentary Document 25295-864, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-864.html: "The House (...) requests the government to enable access to public services for all regardless of vaccination or testing status.’

Published in Law & Politics

Under the Corona Pandemic Emergency Act, the Dutch government has the option to introduce all kinds of restrictive measures, including the wide-ranging and mandatory use of face masks. This is unless the Dutch House of Representatives rejects this measure later this week. In this context, Privacy First today has sent the following email to the House of Representatives:

Dear Members of Parliament,

On 19 November, the government submitted to you the Regulation concerning additional requirements for face masks under COVID-19. Under this regulation, wearing a face mask will become mandatory in numerous places (including shops, railway stations, airports and schools) as of 1 December 2020. This obligation can be periodically extended by the government without the consent of Parliament. Based on the Corona Pandemic Emergency Act, you currently have seven days to exercise your right of veto and prevent the entry into force of a wide-ranging face mask obligation. By 26 November at the latest, you will be able to vote on this issue and reject this measure.

The wearing of face masks has been the subject of much public debate for months. Both the government and the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) have repeatedly stated that wearing non-medical face masks is hardly effective in combating the coronavirus. Scientists seem to be divided on this. At the same time, wearing a face mask can also have the opposite effect, i.e. harm people's health. There is a consensus, however, that in a legal sense the compulsory use of face masks is an infringement of the right to privacy and self-determination.

This accordingly falls within the scope of Privacy First. The right to privacy is a universal human right that is protected in the Netherlands by international and European treaties and by our national Constitution. Any infringement of the right to privacy must therefore be strictly necessary, proportionate and effective. If that is not the case, it is an unjustified breach and therefore a violation of the right to privacy, both as a human right and as a constitutional right. As long as the wearing of non-medical face masks to deafeat the coronavirus has not proven effective and can even have adverse health effects, there cannot be any social necessity for the introduction of a general face mask obligation. Such an obligation would thus amount to a social experiment with unforeseen consequences. This is not in keeping with a free and democratic constitutional society under the rule of law. Privacy First therefore advises you to reject the proposed regulation for the introduction of compulsory face masks and instead propose to continue wearing them on a voluntary basis.

Yours faithfully,

The Privacy First Foundation

Published in Law & Politics

In the fight against the coronavirus, the Dutch government this week made clear that the introduction of a curfew is imminent. Because of this, Privacy First today has sent the following appeal to the Dutch House of Representatives:

Dear Members of Parliament,

This week the Netherlands finds itself at a historical human rights crossroads: is a nation-wide curfew going to be introduced for the first time since World War II? For Privacy First such a far-reaching, generic measure would be disproportionate and far from necessary in virtually every situation. Moreover, in the fight against the coronavirus the effectiveness of such a measure remains unknown to this date. For that alone, there can be no legally required social necessity of a curfew. A curfew could in fact also be counterproductive, as it would harm the mental and (therefore also) physical health of large groups in society. Besides, a curfew in the Netherlands is yet another step towards a surveillance society. The use of lighter, targeted and more effective measures is always preferable. Should a curfew nonetheless be introduced, Privacy First would consider it a massive violation of the right to privacy and freedom of movement. Privacy First therefore calls on you to not let this happen and to thwart the introduction of a curfew.

Yours faithfully,

The Privacy First Foundation


Update 17 February 2021: this week, in summary proceedings, the district court of The Hague handed down a ground-breaking ruling that says that the curfew was wrongly introduced under the Dutch Extraordinary Powers Act. The current Dutch curfew is therefore unlawful. Moreover, the court found that there are "major question marks regarding the factual substantiation by the State of the necessity of the curfew. (...) Before a far-reaching restriction such as a curfew is introduced, it must be clear that no other, less far-reaching measures are available and that the introduction of the curfew will actually have a substantial effect", stated the court, without the conviction that this was the case. In addition, the court raised the question of why an urgent (but voluntary) curfew advice had not been chosen. The court also noted that "the Dutch Outbreak Management Team, according to the team itself, has no evidence that the curfew will make a substantial contribution to reducing the spread of the virus." All this "makes the State's assertion that a curfew is inevitable at least debatable and without convincing justification", the court concluded. (See judgment (in Dutch), paragraphs 4.12-4.14.)

The judgment of the district court of The Hague is in line with Privacy First’s earlier position. Privacy First hopes that this will be confirmed on appeal by the Hague Court of Appeal and that it will also lead to the rejection of the curfew by both the Dutch House of Representatives and the Senate.

Published in Mobility

A Dutch court has today handed down a judgment in preliminary injunction proceedings brought by Privacy First concerning the UBO register. The district court of The Hague confirmed that there is every reason to doubt the legality of the European money laundering directives which are the foundation of the UBO register. On this point the judge follows the very critical opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor. The interim proceedings court rules that it cannot be excluded that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will come to the conclusion that the public character of the UBO register is at odds with the proportionality principle. Questions over its legality were recently referred to the CJEU by a Luxembourg national court. As such, the Dutch court felt there is no need to do the same.

Privacy First had also requested a temporary deactivation of the UBO register. This, however, is a step too far for the court, which states that deactivating the register is not possible as long as the underlying EU guideline is still in force. It would put the Netherlands in a position in which it operates in violation of the European guideline. With this claim, the judge says, Privacy First is getting ahead of itself. Privacy First will examine the ruling on this point, also in view of possibly going into appeal.

‘The introduction of the UBO register would mean that privacy-sensitive data of millions of people will be up for grabs’, comments Privacy First’s attorney Otto Volgenant of Boekx Attorneys.’On all sides there are strong doubts whether this is actually an effective means in the fight against money laundering and terrorism. It’s like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. The Court of Justice of the European Union will eventually adjudicate the case, and I expect it will annul the UBO register.’

Background
At the start of this year, the Privacy First Foundation initiated fundamental legal action against the Dutch government on account of the new UBO register, which is linked to the Trade Register of the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. Under the law the UBO register is based on, all 1.5 million Dutch legal entities that are included in the Trade Register will have to make public all sorts of privacy-sensitive data about their Ultimate Beneficial Owners. This concerns personal data of millions of directors, shareholders and high executives of companies (including family businesses), foundations, associations, churches, social organizations, charities, etc. Privacy First deems that this is a massive privacy violation, one which also creates personal safety risks. That is why Privacy First has asked the court to immediately declare the UBO register unlawful. A lot of information in the register will be publicly available and can be requested by anyone. In Privacy First’s opinion this is completely disproportionate and an infringement of European privacy law. The CJEU will examine whether the European legislation on which the UBO register is based violates the fundamental right to privacy.

The ruling (in Dutch) by the interim proceedings court can be found here: http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:2457.

Update 15 April 2021: yesterday Privacy First filed an urgent appeal against the entire judgment with the Court of Appeal of The Hague. The appeal subpoena can be found HERE (pdf in Dutch). Privacy First requests the Court, inter alia, to ask preliminary questions about the UBO register to the European Court of Justice and to suspend the UBO register until these questions are answered. In view of the major interests at stake, Privacy First hopes that the Court of Appeal of The Hague will hear this case as soon as possible.

Update 17 August 2021: the court hearing in the urgent appeal of Privacy First against the judgment will take place on Monday 27 September at the Court of Appeal in The Hague.

Published in Litigation

Privacy First initiates legal action against the Dutch government on account of the recently-introduced UBO register. The preliminary injunction proceedings point at the invalidity of the legislation on which this register is based. The consequences of this new piece of legislation are far-reaching as the register contains very privacy-sensitive information. Data relating to the financial situation of natural persons will be up for grabs. More than 1.5 million legal entities that are registered in the Dutch Trade Register will have to make public details about their Ultimate Beneficial Owners (UBOs). The UBO register is publicly accessible: a request for information costs €2.50.

The UBO register aims to prevent money laundering but will lead to defamation.

The privacy breach that is the result of the UBO register and the public accessibility of sensitive data are disproportionate. The goal of the register is to thwart money laundering and terrorist financing. In order to achieve this goal there is no need for a UBO register, at least not one that is publicly accessible.

That is why Privacy First wants the UBO register to be rendered inoperative by a court, which, in case necessary, should submit questions of interpretation to the highest court in Europe: the European Court of Justice. In cases like these, the judiciary will have the final say. It is not uncommon for a court to overrule privacy-violating legislation and in this respect, Privacy First’s litigation has been successful in the past.

The proceedings will take place before The Hague District Court on 25 February 2021 at 12pm. The entire summons can be found HERE (pdf in Dutch). The ruling will follow two or three weeks after the hearing.

If you have any questions, please contact us or our attorney Otto Volgenant of Boekx Attorneys. Privacy First could use your help and would be very pleased to welcome you as a donor.

Background of the UBO register case

On 24 June 2020, the Dutch ‘Implementation Act for the Registration of Ultimate Beneficial Owners of Companies and Other Legal Entities’ came into effect in the Netherlands. On the basis of this new Act, a new UBO register which is linked to the Commercial Register of the Dutch Chamber of Commerce will contain information about all ultimate beneficial owners of companies and other legal entities founded in the Netherlands. The register should indicate how many shares are owned by the UBO: 25-50%, 50-75% or more than 75%. Furthermore, the name, month and year of birth as well as the nationality of the UBO will be made public, with all the privacy risks this entails.

Since 27 September 2020, newly founded entities have to register the ultimate beneficial owners in the UBO register. Existing legal entities will have to do so before 27 March 2022.

The Act provides very few possibilities to safeguard information. This is possible only for persons that are protected by the police, minors and those placed under guardianship. This means that the shares of practically every UBO will become a matter of public record. Anyone has access to the UBO register, with extracts coming at a price of €2.50.

European money laundering directive

The new Act stems from the fifth European money laundering directive, which obliges EU Member States to register UBOs and disclose their details to the public. According to the European legislator, this contributes to the proclaimed objective of countering money laundering and terrorist financing. The transparency is supposed to be a deterrent for persons who set out to launder money or finance terrorism.

Massive privacy violation and fundamental criticism

The question is whether this produces a windfall effect. Registering the personal data of all UBOs and making these publicly available is a generic precautionary measure. 99.99% of UBOs have nothing to do with money laundering or terrorist financing. Even if it were proportionate to collect information on all UBOs, making that information available only to government agencies engaged in combating money laundering and terrorism should suffice. It is not appropriate to disclose that information to everyone. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) deemed this privacy violation to be disproportionate. This opinion, however, did not lead to an amendment of the European Directive.

When this Act was discussed in Dutch Parliament, fundamental criticism came from various corners of society. The business community made its voice heard because it perceived privacy risks and feared − and now indeed experiences − an increase in costs. UBOs of family-owned companies that have remained out of the public eye up until now are running major privacy and security risks. There was also a great deal of attention for the position of social organizations − such as church communities and NGOs − that attach great importance to the protection of those affiliated with them. Associations and foundations that do not have owners face a different burden: they have to put the data that are already in the Trade Register in yet another register. Unfortunately these complaints have not resulted in any changes to the legislation.

Legal proceedings look promising

Privacy First has initiated legal proceedings against the UBO register for violation of the fundamental right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Privacy First asks the Dutch court to render the UBO register inoperative in the short term and, if necessary, to submit questions of interpretation on this matter to the highest court in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The Dutch Act as well as the underlying European directive are in conflict with both the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the GDPR. It is the legislator who has created this legislation, but it will be up to the court to do a thorough review thereof. Ultimately, the court has the last word. If the (European) legislator fails to take adequate account of the protection of fundamental rights, then the (European) court can invalidate this legislation. This would not be unique. The Court of Justice of the European Union has previously declared legislation invalid due to privacy violations, for example the Data Retention Directive and, more recently, the Privacy Shield. Dutch courts too regularly annul privacy-invading regulations. Privacy First has previously successfully challenged the validity of legislation, for example in the proceedings concerning the Telecommunications Data Retention Act and the System Risk Indication (SyRI). Viewed against this background, a positive outcome in the case against the UBO register is all but unlikely.

Published in Litigation
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