Despite an urgent call by Privacy First to the Dutch House of Representatives to block the coronavirus entry pass, the introduction of this pass throughout The Netherlands as of 25 September 2021 unfortunately seems to be a reality. Privacy First expects that this will lead to division of Dutch society, exclusion of vulnerable groups, discrimination and violation of everyone’s right to privacy. Moreover, the introduction of this pass leads to vaccination coercion, which violates everyone’s right to dispose freely of their own body. This is incompatible with the right to physical integrity and self-determination and fuels the undermining of our trust in the democratic rule of law, in which these fundamental rights are enshrined.

With massive encroachment and violation of human rights looming, it is up to the courts to intervene and correct the government. In line with our statutory objective to take action in the public interest, the current lawsuit by Dutch attorney Bart Maes and others to stop the coronavirus entry pass therefore has our full support. Privacy First would like to emphasize that this is not a statement against vaccination (on the contrary), but that it is crucial to fully respect and protect everyone’s human rights, especially in these times. Critical voices should be taken seriously and not be dismissed on emotional grounds. In both the short and the long term, this is the best guarantee for an open, free and healthy society.

Published in Law & Politics

Today, Privacy First sent the following plea to the Dutch House of Representatives: 

Dear Members of Parliament, 

It is with great disapproval that the Privacy First Foundation has taken note of the planned introduction of coronavirus entry passes for bars and restaurants, events and cultural institutions. This will lead to a division in society, exclusion of vulnerable groups and a massive violation of everyone’s right to privacy. Below, Privacy First will briefly explain this.

Serious violation of fundamental rights

The coronavirus entry pass (‘corona pass’) constitutes a serious infringement of numerous fundamental human rights, including the right to privacy, physical self-determination, bodily integrity and freedom of movement in conjunction with other classic human rights such as the right to participate in cultural life and various children’s rights such as the right to recreation. Any curtailment of these rights must be strictly necessary, proportionate and effective. In the case of the corona pass, however, this has not been demonstrated to date and the required necessity is simply being assumed in the public interest. More privacy-friendly alternatives to reopen and normalize society seem never to have been seriously considered. For these reasons alone, the corona pass cannot pass the human rights test and should therefore be repealed. In this context, Privacy First would also like to remind you of countries such as England, Belgium and Denmark where a similar pass was deliberately not introduced, or has been done way with not long after its introduction. In the Netherlands, there has been a great lack of support in recent days for the corona pas and many thousands of entrepreneurs have already let it be known that they will not cooperate. Privacy First therefore expects that the introduction of the corona pass will lead to massive civil disobedience and successful lawsuits against the Dutch government.

Social exclusion

The introduction of the corona pass violates the general prohibition of discrimination, as it introduces a broad social distinction based on medical status. This puts a strain on social life and may lead to widespread inequality, stigmatization, social segregation and even possible tensions, as large groups in society will not (or not systematically) want to, or will not be able to get tested or vaccinated (for a variety of reasons), or obtain a digital test or vaccination certificate. During our National Privacy Conference in early 2021, Privacy First already took the position that the introduction of a mandatory ‘corona passport’ would have a socially disruptive effect.[1] On that occasion, the Dutch Data Protection Authority, among others, explicitly took a stand against the introduction of such a passport. The aforementioned social risks apply all the more strongly to the vaccination coercion that is caused by the introduction of the corona pass. In this regard, Privacy First would like to remind you of the fact that both your House of Representatives and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have expressed their opposition to a direct or indirect vaccination requirement.[2] In addition, the corona pass will have the potential to set precedent for other medical conditions and other sectors of society, putting pressure on a much wider range of socio-economic human rights. For these reasons, Privacy First calls on you to block the introduction of the corona pass.

Multiple privacy violations

From the perspective of the right to privacy, there are a number of yet other specific concerns and questions. First of all, the corona pass introduces a mandatory ‘health proof’ for participation in a large part of social life, in flagrant violation of the right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Through the mandatory display of an ID card in addition to the corona pass, an entirely new identification requirement is created in public places. The existing anonymity in the public space is thus removed, with all the dangers and risks that this entails. Moreover, this new identification requirement raises questions about the capacities of entrepreneurs to determine the identity of a person and to assess the state of health by means of the corona pass.

Moreover, the underlying legislation results in the inconsistent application of existing legislation with regard to the same act, i.e. testing, with far-reaching consequences on the one hand for an important attainment such as medical confidentiality and the public’s trust in that confidentiality, and on the other for the practical implementation of retention periods of the test results while the processing of these results does not change. After all, it is not the result of the test that should determine whether the registration of the testing falls under the Dutch Medical Treatment Agreement Act (‘Wgbo’, which requires medical confidentiality and a 20-year retention period) or the Dutch Public Health Act (‘Wpg’, which requires a 5-year retention period), but the act of testing itself. Besides, it is questionable why a connection was sought with the Wpg and/or Wgbo now that it is about obtaining a certificate for participation in society and it does not concern medical treatment (Wgbo) or public health tasks for that purpose. The only ground for processing personal data for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the coronavirus and for breaching medical confidentiality, should be consent. However, in this case there cannot be the legally required freely given consent, since testing and vaccination will be a mandatory condition for participation in society.

Privacy requires clarity

Many other things are and remain unclear: what data will be stored, where, by whom and in which systems? To what extent will there be an international and European exchange of such data? Which parties with which purposes will have access to or will copy the data, or put these in huge new national databases together with our health data? Will we have constant personal localization and identification, or only occasional verification and authentication? Why can test results be kept for an unnecessarily long time? How great are the risks of hacking, data breaches, fraud and forgery? To what extent have decentralized, privacy-friendly technologies and privacy by design, open source software, data minimization and anonymization seriously been considered? How long will test certificates remain free of charge? Is work already underway to introduce an ‘alternative digital medium’ to the Dutch CoronaCheck app, namely a chip (card), with all the objections and risks that entails? Why has there been no independent Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)? How many more times must the country accept emergency laws to close privacy leaks, when our overburdened and understaffed Data Protection Authority is already noting that there is no legal basis for the processing of the data concerned? How will unforeseen uses and abuses, function creep and profiling be prevented, and how is privacy oversight arranged? Will non-digital, paper alternatives remain available at all times? Why is the ‘yellow booklet’ not accepted as a privacy-friendly alternative, as it is in other countries? What happens with the test material – i.e. everyone’s DNA – at the various testing sites? And when will the corona pass be abolished? In other words, to what extent is this actually a ‘temporary’ measure?

In the view of Privacy First, the introduction of the corona pass will lead merely to an impractical burden on entrepreneurs, innumerable deficiencies and destruction of capital for society. Privacy First therefore requests that the members of the House of Representatives block the introduction of the corona pass. Failing to do so, Privacy First reserves the right to have the legislation introducing the corona pass reviewed against international and European law and declared inoperative by the courts. Preparations for such legal proceedings by us and many others are already underway.

Yours sincerely,

Privacy First Foundation 

[1] See National Privacy Conference 28 January 2021, https://youtu.be/asEX1jy4Tv0?t=9378, starting at 2h 36 min 18 sec.
[2] See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2361 (2021): Covid-19 vaccines: ethical, legal and practical considerations, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/29004/html, par. 7.3.1-7.3.2: ‘‘Ensure that citizens are informed that the vaccination is NOT mandatory and that no one is politically, socially, or otherwise pressured to get themselves vaccinated, if they do not wish to do so themselves; ensure that no one is discriminated against for not having been vaccinated, due to possible health risks or not wanting to be vaccinated.’’ See also, inter alia, Dutch House of Representatives, Motion by Member Azarkan on no corona vaccination requirement (28 October 2020), House of Representatives, 25295-676, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-676.html: ‘‘The House of Representatives (...) expresses that there should never be a direct or indirect corona vaccination obligation in the future’’; Motion by Member Azarkan on access to public benefits for all regardless of vaccination or testing status (5 January 2021), House of Representatives 25295-864, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-864.html: "The House of Representatives (...) requests the government to allow access to public benefits for all regardless of vaccination or testing status."


An earlier, similar version of this commentary appeared as early as March 2021: https://www.privacyfirst.eu/focus-areas/law-and-politics/695-privacy-first-position-concerning-the-dutch-draft-bill-on-covid-19-test-certificates.html.

Published in Law & Politics

It is with great concern that Privacy First has taken note of the Dutch draft bill on COVID-19 test certificates. Under this bill, a negative COVID-19 test certificate will become mandatory for access to sporting and youth activities, all sorts of events and public places including bars and restaurants and cultural and higher education institutions, Those who have no such certificates risk getting high fines. This will put pressure on everyone's right to privacy. 

Serious violation of fundamental rights

The draft bill severely infringes numerous fundamental and human rights, including the right to privacy, physical integrity and freedom of movement in combination with other relevant human rights such as the right to participate in cultural life, the right to education and various children’s rights such as the right to recreation. Any curtailment of these rights must be strictly necessary, proportionate and effective. However, the current draft bill fails to demonstrate this, while the required necessity in the public interest is simply assumed. More privacy-friendly alternatives to reopen and normalize society do not seem to have been considered. For these reasons alone, the proposal cannot pass the human rights test and should therefore be withdrawn.

Social exclusion

The proposal also violates the general prohibition of discrimination, as it introduces a broad social distinction based on medical status. This puts pressure on social life and may lead to large-scale inequality, stigmatization, social segregation and even possible tensions, as large groups in society will not (or not systematically) want to or will not be able to get tested (for various reasons). During the recent Dutch National Privacy Conference organized by Privacy First and the Platform for the Information Society (ECP), it already became clear that the introduction of a mandatory ‘corona passport’ could have a socially disruptive effect.[1] On that occasion the Dutch Data Protection Authority, among others, took a strong stand against it. Such social risks apply all the more strongly to the indirect vaccination obligation that follows on from the corona test certificate. In this regard, Privacy First wants to recall that recently both the Dutch House of Representatives and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have expressed their opposition to a direct or indirect vaccination requirement.[2] In addition, the draft bill under consideration will have the potential to set precedents for other medical conditions and other sectors of society, putting pressure on a much broader range of socio-economic rights. For all of these reasons, Privacy First strongly recommends that the Dutch government withdraw this draft bill.

Multiple privacy violations

Moreover, from the perspective of the right to privacy, a number of specific objections and questions apply. First of all, the draft bill introduces a mandatory ‘proof of healthiness’ for participation in a large part of social life, in flagrant violation of the right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Also, the draft bill introduces an identification requirement at the entrance of public places, in violation of the right to anonymity in public spaces. The bill also results in the inconsistent application of existing legislation to the same act, namely testing, with far-reaching consequences on the one hand for a precious achievement like medical confidentiality and the trust of citizens in that confidentiality, and on the other hand for the practical implementation of retention periods while the processing of the test result does not change. After all, it is not the result of the test that should determine whether the file falls under the Dutch Medical Treatment Contracts Act (WGBO, which has a medical secrecy requirement and a retention period of 20 years) or under the Public Health Act (with a retention period of five years), but the act of testing itself. Moreover, it is unclear why the current draft bill seeks to connect to the Public Health Act and/or WGBO if it only concerns obtaining a test certificate for the purpose of participating in society (and therefore no medical treatment or public health task for that purpose). Here, the only possibility for processing and for breaching medical confidentiality should be the basis of consent. In this case, however, there cannot be the legally required freely given consent, since testing will be a compelling condition for participation in society.

Privacy requires clarity

Many other issues are still unclear: which data will be stored, where, by whom, and which data may possibly be exchanged? To what extent will there be personal localization and identification as opposed to occasional verification and authentication? Why may test results be kept for an unnecessarily long time (five or even 20 years)? How great are the risks of hacking, data breaches, fraud and forgery? To what extent will there be decentralized, privacy-friendly technology, privacy by design, open source software, data minimization and anonymization? Will test certificates remain free of charge and to what extent will privacy-friendly diversity and choice in testing applications be possible? Is work already underway to introduce an ‘alternative digital carrier’ in place of the Dutch CoronaCheck app, namely a chip, with all the risks that entails? How will function creep and profiling be prevented and are there any arrangements when it comes to data protection supervision? Will non-digital, paper alternatives always remain available? What will happen to the test material taken, i.e. everyone’s DNA? And when will the corona test certificates be abolished?

As long as such concerns and questions remain unanswered, submission of this bill makes no sense at all and the corona test certificate will only lead to the destruction of social capital. Privacy First therefore reiterates its request that the current proposal be withdrawn and not submitted to Parliament. Failing this, Privacy First will reserve the right to have the matter reviewed by the courts and declared unlawful.

[1] See the Dutch National Privacy Conference, 28 January 2021, https://youtu.be/asEX1jy4Tv0?t=9378, starting at 2h 36 min 18 sec.
[2] See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2361 (2021): Covid-19 vaccines: ethical, legal and practical considerations, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/29004/html, par. 7.3.1-7.3.2: “Ensure that citizens are informed that the vaccination is NOT mandatory and that no one is politically, socially, or otherwise pressured to get themselves vaccinated, if they do not wish to do so themselves; ensure that no one is discriminated against for not having been vaccinated, due to possible health risks or not wanting to be vaccinated.” See also, for example, Dutch House of Representatives, Motion by Member Azarkan on No Corona Vaccination Obligation (28 October 2020), Parliamentary Document 25295-676, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-676.html: "The House (...) pronounces that there should never be a direct or indirect coronavirus vaccination obligation in the future"; Motion by Member Azarkan on Access to Public Benefits for All Regardless of Vaccination or Testing Status (5 January 2021), Parliamentary Document 25295-864, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-25295-864.html: "The House (...) requests the government to enable access to public services for all regardless of vaccination or testing status.’

Published in Law & Politics

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