"Son yıllarda Hollanda polisinin yasadışı faaliyetlerle mücadele konusunda daha fazla oranda insansız uçaklardan kullandığı belirtildi.
AD gazetesinin yer alan bir haberde, "drones" adı verilen insansız uçakların özellikle insan ve uyuşturucu ticareti veya yasadışı suç örgütlerinin araştırıldığı belirtildi. Son dönemlerde bu uçakalrın daha sık kullanıldığı belirtilen haberde 2009'dan bu yana en az 132 kez kullanıldığı belirtildi.
Altyapı ve Çevre Bakanlığı, Güvenlik ve Adalet Bakanlığı ve İçişleri Bakanlığı verilerine göre Hollanda üzerinde en az 40 noktada adı geçen uçakların uçtuğu ve son dönemlerde bu sayıda artma olduğu belirtiliyor.
Gizlilik Birincilik Vakfı (De stichting Privacy First), polis tarafından kullanılan bu uygulamanın, haber verilmeden yapıldığını bundan dolayı da yasadışı olduğunu belirtiyor.
Öte yandan D66 milletvekili Gerard Schouw'da Mecliste bu konu hakkında açıklama isteyeceğini belirtirken "bu tür kontroller yasal ve kontrol edilebilir şekilde olmalı. Şuanda hiç bir şey bilmiyoruz"dedi.
Polis geçtiğimiz yıl Aralık ve bu yıl Şubat ayında Savunma Bakanlığına ait olan Drones uçaklarını Harlingen'deki hırsızlık olaylarını çözmek için kulandığını belirtmişti."
Bron: SonHaber.nl, 18 March 2013
As of 2 October 2012, the new Dutch National Human Rights Institute (College voor de Rechten van de Mens, CRM) will open its doors. Recently the Institute under formation established the essential pillars of its policy for the coming years, namely 1) care for the elderly, 2) immigrants and 3) discrimination on the labor market. However, of all human rights, in recent years the right to privacy is worst off in the Netherlands. Contrary to the above mentioned pillars (that concern vulnerable groups of people), the right to privacy appertains to anyone who finds him or herself on Dutch soil. In essence this has turned the entire Dutch population into a vulnerable group, especially in comparison to the situation in other countries where the protection of privacy is much better regulated. A few years ago the right to privacy was even about to become a complete illusion in the Netherlands. In May 2009 this state of affairs led to the foundation of the Dutch Platform for the Protection of Civil Rights (Platform Bescherming Burgerrechten) in which various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have joined forces. This week the Platform sent the below appeal (co-authored and signed by Privacy First) to the chairman of the future National Human Rights Institute, Laurien Koster:
Dear Ms. Koster,
Today, of all human rights, the right to privacy finds itself under the most pressure. Therefore, it is with concern that the Platform for the Protection of Civil Rights recently took note of the three essential pillars of the National Human Rights Institute for the coming years, namely 1) care for the elderly, 2) immigrants and 3) discrimination on the labor market. Not willing to take anything away from the social importance of these three pillars, in this letter we ask you to still consider adopting privacy as one of the pillars of your Institute.
In recent years, there seems to be the tendency in the Netherlands to confront every social problem with a standard formula, that is say, more digital registration, more linkage of files, opening up systems and central databases that become accessible to ever more officials and third parties, restriction of professional autonomy, preventive controls and profiling. It seems as if people, especially politicians, influenced as they are by the media and the vox populi – which in turn is affected by the media – think that these instruments exert a certain control over society that should lead to more order, tranquillity and security. In our opinion the opposite effect is increasingly the case. After all, digitalization implies that the quantity of data that is stored of every citizen becomes ever greater and less clear and less controllable. This especially applies to data that have been inserted or linked up erroneously or that are obsolete. The exponential growth of digital registrations sees a dramatic increase in risks of data leakages while new forms of identity fraud and identity theft arise. This means that the insecurity of digital systems becomes a direct threat to citizens. Furthermore, there’s a risk that citizens become their own digital ‘doubles’ through digital profiling. This implies that the autonomy of the free citizen who participates in society – a characteristic so very important in a democratic constitutional State – is seriously put at stake.
Going back to a society without the Internet or digital files is by no means what we advocate for (if it were possible anyway). However, a sensible use of technological means, among which data storage, biometrics and other such technological assets, will be necessary to retain our democratic constitutional State and affiliated fundamental rights. Particularly in these times of unforeseen technological possibilities we should once more realize how important the fundamental principles of our society are. Therefore, it should every time be assessed what is within the boundaries of acceptability and to what extent possible alternatives on a human scale, such as personal contact but also assistance and service, are desirable or necessary.
Privacy constitutes the basis of our democratic constitutional State. Without privacy many other human rights are at issue, among which are the right to confidential communication and freedom of speech, non-discrimination, freedom of movement, association and assembly, demonstration, culture and religion, press freedom as well as the right to a fair trial. Apart from that we observe that in the Netherlands the right to privacy can only rely on patchy protection by government supervision, that is to say, it only concerns the protection of personal data. As far as the protection of personal privacy in the broadest sense of the word is concerned (and this includes the inviolability of the home and the right to physical integrity) there is hardly any government supervision. Moreover, with regard to the realization and compliance to as well as the protection and promotion of the right to privacy in conjunction with other human rights, government supervision is lacking altogether. It is especially in these areas that your Institute has added value and can help overcome the ‘human rights gap’ that has come into existence in the Netherlands in recent decades.
We hope that your Institute will still make the right to privacy one of its policy pillars. If you wish, the organizations that together form the Platform for the Protection of Civil Rights are happy to supply you with information and advice.
On behalf of the participants of the Platform for the Protection of Civil Rights I remain respectfully yours.
chairman of the Platform for the Protection of Civil Rights
On behalf of the Platform participants:
Humanistisch Verbond (Humanist Association)
Stichting KDVP (KDVP Foundation; Dome of DBC Free Practices)
Stichting Meldpunt Misbruik ID-plicht (Contact Point on Abuse of Mandatory Identification)
Ouders Online (Parents Online)
Stichting Privacy First (Privacy First Foundation)
Burgerrechtenvereniging Vrijbit (Civil rights society Vrijbit)
Jacques Barth (on behalf of Stichting Brein en Hart i.o. (Brain and Heart Foundation under formation)
Joyce Hes (advisor to the Platform for the Protection of Civil Rights)
Kaspar Mengelberg (on behalf of DeVrijePsych (The Free Psychiatrist))
A pdf version of this letter can be found HERE (in Dutch)
Update: in a written reply (pdf) the Institute under formation notifies that in the Netherlands there is indeed ‘‘still a lot to be done to safeguard the right to privacy’’. The Institute also acknowledges the limited mandate of the Dutch Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens). However, for the time being the Institute sticks to its intended strategic agenda. Nevertheless, in the future (also the coming three years) the Institute ‘‘can’t and won’t distance itself from problems when realizing the right to privacy’’. Privacy First will be eager to remind the Institute of this in urgent cases.
On Thursday 28 February 2013 there will be an important debate about the Dutch 'OV-chipkaart' (Public Transport chip card) in the Dutch House of Representatives (permanent commission for Infrastructure and Environment). In preparation of this debate the Privacy First Foundation today brought the following points to the attention of relevant Dutch Members of Parliament:
- The 'anonymous' OV chip card is not anonymous because it contains a unique identification number in the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)-chip with which travellers can be identified and tracked afterwards through the linking of transaction data. In the view of Privacy First, this constitutes a violation of two human rights, namely the freedom of movement in conjunction with the right to privacy, in other words the classic right to travel freely and anonymously within one’s own country. Privacy First is eager to learn from the House of Representatives as well as the responsible member of government which steps have already been taken for the introduction of an anonymous OV chip card that is truly anonymous, for example through the development of new chip technology and modern forms of encryption without a unique identification number (privacy by design).
- As long as (truly) anonymous OV chip cards and anonymous discount cards do not exist, printed travel tickets are to remain available for travellers who want to travel anonymously. Moreover, a special, anonymous discount card for children and elderly people should also be introduced.
- Compulsory check-ins and check-outs for students carrying student OV chip cards contravenes with the right of students to travel freely and anonymously. Compulsory check-ins and check-outs therefore have to be abolished.
- The planned closure of turnstiles at Dutch National Railway stations (Nederlandse Spoorwegen, NS) constitutes an unnecessary restriction to people's freedom of movement and can lead to dangerous situations in the event of calamities. It also creates unsafe situations in individual cases, for example for children, elderly people, ill or incapacitated people who need to be accompanied through the station by family or friends. Therefore Privacy First makes an urgent appeal to leave the turnstiles open at all times or to get rid of them and replace them with anonymous check-in and check-out poles.
- The current retention period of OV chip card data should be reduced to an absolute minimum. Moreover, travellers should be offered the option to erase their travel history at any given moment.
- The OV chip card dramatically increases costs for travellers, either when purchasing a chip card, when forgetting to check out, in the event of a malfunctioning card or check-out pole or when deciding to travel anonymously with a printed ticket. Privacy First is eager to hear from the House of Representatives as well as the responsible government member which measures will be taken to make travelling with an OV chip card cheaper while preserving people's privacy.
The Dutch Ministry of Justice wants to track all motorists. The Privacy First Foundation is preparing for legal action.
Under a new, far-reaching legislative proposal, the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice Ivo Opstelten aims to enhance criminal investigation by introducing a four week storage period of the number plates of all cars through camera surveillance and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). Current rules dictate that these data have to be deleted within 24 hours. In 2010, the previous Dutch Minister of Justice (Hirsch Ballin) planned to make a similar proposal with a storage period of 10 days. However, the Dutch House of Representatives then declared this topic to be controversial. In his current proposal, Opstelten takes things a few steps further. Early 2010 the Dutch Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, CBP) ruled that police forces were not adhering to Dutch privacy rules by storing number plates for a greater period than was legally allowed. According to the CBP, all number plates that are not suspect (so-called ‘no hits’) are to be removed from relevant databases immediately. Opstelten’s plan to store the number plates of unsuspected citizens for four weeks directly flies in the face of this.
The Privacy First Foundation considers Opstelten’s legislative proposal to be a threat to society. ‘‘Under this measure every citizen becomes a potential suspect. You ought to trust the government, but it’s that very government that distrusts its own citizens’’, Privacy First chairman Bas Filippini declares. In a healthy democratic constitutional State the government should leave innocent citizens alone. Under this legislative proposal the government crosses that fundamental line. Collectively monitoring all motorists for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes is completely disproportionate and therefore unlawful.
In case Dutch Parliament adopts this legislative proposal, Privacy First will summon the Netherlands and have the legislative Act in question declared null and void on account of being in violation with the right to privacy. If needed, Privacy First and individual co-plaintiffs will be prepared to litigate all the way up to the European Court of Human Rights in
This week the Dutch House of Representatives will vote on a legislative proposal on the taking of 10 fingerprints of all foreigners (immigrants) for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes. This legislative proposal originally dates back to March 2009, the period in which all the Dutch government could come up with was privacy-intrusive legislation. The Privacy First Foundation deems this legislative proposal to be in breach of the right to privacy and the prohibition of self-incrimination. Below is the email that Privacy First sent to relevant Members of Parliament this afternoon:
Dear Members of Parliament,
Next Tuesday you will cast your vote on a legislative proposal aimed at extending the use of biometric features (fingerprints, facial scans) of immigrants. Hereby the Privacy First Foundation advises you to vote against this legislative proposal, especially in light of its disproportionate character. This disproportionality is demonstrated by the lack of relevant statistics and the relatively low fraud figures mentioned in the annotation to the legislative proposal dated 13 July 2012 by former Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Gerd Leers (Christian-democratic party CDA). As with all human rights, any infringement of the right to privacy (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR) requires a concrete statistical necessity instead of vague suspicions and wishful thinking. Therefore, it is all the more worrying that under this legislative proposal the prints of as many as 10 fingers will be taken of every immigrant to ‘compensate’ for the fact that the biometric technology is inadequate to suffice with just one or two fingerprints. However, are these 10 fingerprints not actually meant to serve the interests of criminal investigation behind this legislative proposal...? In this respect, a comparison could be made with the following consideration by the Minister of Justice Benk Korthals (Dutch political party VVD), dated 10 December 2001:
‘‘In response to the question by the CDA, I am not prepared to proceed to the taking of fingerprints of all Dutch citizens in the interests of criminal investigation. This would be disproportionate, considering for example the number of print cases offered on an annual basis, in the whole of the Netherlands around 10,000. Furthermore, it is basically impracticable because prints have to be made of all ten fingers and possibly the hand palms for them to be of any use for criminal investigation. Apart from the administrative processing and control, this would require too big a drain on police resources. In the context of the new ID card, a new biometric feature such as a fingerprint will possibly be adopted. This will be about determining whether the holder of the ID card is in actual fact the very person that is mentioned on it. Perhaps just one fingerprint will be enough for that, but that is absolutely insufficient for criminal investigation.’’
In other words: under the guise of combating fraud, with this legislative proposal a centralised search register of immigrants is created, exactly in the same way that this was about to happen a few years ago with the fingerprints of all Dutch citizens. Privacy First assumes that the various reasons why this last project was reversed midway through 2011 at the insistence of your Parliament (!) are known to you and apply just as much for the current legislative proposal. In addition, this proposal has a stigmatizing effect since it causes a whole population group (immigrants) to be seen as potential suspects. This creates an inversion of the presumption of innocence and conflicts with the prohibition of self-incrimination. In that sense the legislative proposal constitutes a collective violation of both Article 6 (nemo tenetur) and Article 8 ECHR (privacy and physical integrity). With regard to the Passport Act, this has led to a Dutch and European snowball effect of lawsuits since 2009. Therefore, Privacy First hopes that the House of Representatives has the progressive insight to prevent a repetition of this history.
Update 29 January 2013: the legislative proposal (no. 33192) has unfortunately been accepted by the House of Representatives this afternoon (video; starting at 19m36s). Dutch political parties D66, SP, ChristenUnie and the Party for the Animals voted against. Read also the report by Privacy Barometer and today’s article in newspaper NRC Handelsblad. Next stop: the Senate...
Update 29 January 2013, 21:45: Left-wing party GroenLinks ('GreenLeft') has notified that it had intended to vote against and will have the voting record corrected.
Update 30 January 2013: today GroenLinks notified the House of Representatives of its vote against the legislative proposal.
Update 31 January 2013: the article in NRC Handelsblad was also published in the affiliated newspaper NRC Next. Read also today's article in newspaper Nederlands Dagblad.
Update 8 February 2013: for the current status of the legislative proposal in the Dutch Senate, click HERE.
Update 6 March 2013: today Privacy First has sent a similar version of the email above to the Commission for Immigration and Asylum of the Dutch Senate.
In the context of a public consultation, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior recently requested Privacy First to react to the current government proposal to revise Article 13 of the Dutch Constitution (right to confidentiality of postal mail, telephone and telegraph). Below are our comments on the current draft of the legislative proposal (click HERE for the original Dutch version in pdf):
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Deputy Director for Constitutional Affairs and Legislation
Mr. W.J. Pedroli, LL.M.
PO Box 20011
2500 EA The Hague
Amsterdam, 29 December 2012
Re: Comments by Privacy First on the revision of Article 13 of the Constitution
Dear Mr. Pedroli,
On October 16th 2012 you requested the Privacy First Foundation to react to the draft legislative proposal to revise Article 13 of our Constitution. Privacy First is grateful for your request and is happy to hereby provide you with critical comments. In the first place, Privacy First fully endorses the desire of this government to modernise the current, archaic Article 13 of the Constitution. However, Privacy First regrets the fact that the government has not seized the opportunity to also renew and reinforce other ‘fundamental rights in the digital age’.
In the view of Privacy First, the first and third paragraphs of the current draft legislative proposal to revise Article 13 of the Constitution form powerful anchors for a future-proof right to confidential communication. The first paragraph rightly upgrades the old confidentiality of postal mail, telephone and telegraph to a technology-independent (or technology-neutral) confidentiality of mail and telecommunication. The third paragraph forms a correct guarantee for the horizontal effect thereof. Moreover, Privacy First endorses the broad interpretation that is being given by the draft Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to various relevant concepts. However, the second paragraph of the draft proposal contains a systematic imbalance which, in times less democratic, could endanger the rule of law in our society. It is precisely this paragraph which most of Privacy First’s criticism is focused upon. Other points of criticism concern compulsory notification towards citizens in the event that special powers have been used by the intelligence and security services, traffic data as well as the lack of a comparative legal section in the EM.
Judicial authorisation and national security
The EM rightly states that "in light of Article 13 (...) the protection of citizens against violations by the government is paramount, especially in light of the actions by the police and intelligence services. Demanding a judicial authorisation under the Constitution provides a strong and clear constitutional guarantee." It is therefore incomprehensible that in the second paragraph of the draft legislative proposal the domain of national security is being excluded from judicial supervision. After all, where the concentration of power is supreme, judicial checks and balances should be the most potent to prevent any (future) abuses of power. In light of European history, the exception in paragraph 2 is in fact entirely irresponsible: unfortunately, even in our part of the world a democratic constitutional State is not a static matter of fact. Apart from that, the current draft proposal sends out a dangerous signal to foreign governments. Furthermore, Privacy First deems the exception in paragraph 2 unwise in view of possible technological developments in the (far) future. The same holds true in relation to the (further) expansion of the notion of ‘national security’. Also in the future, the Dutch population needs to be protected against arbitrary violations of confidentiality of communication; in this regard the current wording of paragraph 2 offers no guarantee whatsoever.
Adding an extra ‘judicial layer’ would strengthen the current system of internal and external supervision on the intelligence and security services (and hence reinforce our democratic constitutional State). In this regard, the system of judicial supervision in a country like Canada could be a source of inspiration. Such judicial control would also be in line with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights:
“The Court has indicated, when reviewing legislation governing secret surveillance in the light of Article 8 [ECHR], that in a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge.”
In light hereof, the current wording of paragraph 2 is not expedient. Privacy First thus advises a revision of this paragraph as follows:
“This right can be restricted in cases defined by law with the authorisation of a judge or, in the interest of national security, with authorisation from one or more ministers appointed by law.’’ [lining through by Privacy First]
As a possible alternative to the introduction of judicial supervision in the security domain, Privacy First advises to upgrade the existing Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) into a more powerful, independent supervisory body, similar to the Belgian or German model with overall compulsory inspections beforehand instead of random supervisory inspections afterwards.
A second point of criticism concerns the lack of an explicit constitutional notion of compulsory notification in the event of any infringement of the confidentiality of mail and telecommunication. Compulsory notification provides legal protection to citizens and contributes to the correct enforcement of law by the government, also in the security domain. Like judicial authorisation, this offers the best guarantuees against short-term as well as long-term violations.
From Privacy First's point of view, traffic data too need to fall within the scope of Article 13 of the Constitution. These data are often related to the content of communication; this even follows from the text of the EM itself, where text messages ('SMS') and the email subject line are rightly mentioned as examples. The same goes for instance for search terms in search engines. Apart from that, it is possible to deduce the content of communication between individuals and/or companies from traffic data in conjunction with other data (possibly collected in real-time). So here too, a vigorous regime of Article 13 of the Constitution in conjunction with judicial supervision is essential.
Finally, in the current EM Privacy First misses a comparative legal paragraph in which current Article 13 of the Constitution is compared with constitutional best practices from countries with either a civil law or a common law tradition. Additionally, with a new Article 13 of the Constitution that is state-of-the-art internationally, the Netherlands could positively distinguish itself and to some degree regain its former position as a leader in human rights.
Privacy First hopes that this advice will be of use to you. We are willing to give clarifications on the above points upon request.
Privacy First Foundation
Director of Operations
 EM, at 18, 20.
 Compare EM at 11, 1st paragraph.
 ECHR 22 November 2012, Telegraaf vs. Netherlands (Appl.no. 39315/06), para. 98. Compare also ibid., paras. 98-102.
 EM, at 18.
Update 8 February 2013: see also the critical comments by the Netherlands Committee of Jurists for Human Rights (NJCM), Bits of Freedom and the newly established Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (in Dutch).
The appeal by Privacy First and 19 citizens against the Dutch government
On February 2, 2011, the Privacy First Foundation and 21 co-plaintiffs (citizens) were declared inadmissible by the district court of The Hague in our civil case against the Netherlands regarding the 2009 Dutch Passport Act. A proposal by the Dutch Minister of the Interior, Ms. Liesbeth Spies, to revise the Passport Act has been presented to the House of Representatives on 17 October this year. However, in this legislative proposal the original provision (Article 4b) concerning a centralised database remains intact for the greater part. Under this provision, biometric data of every Dutch citizen will be used for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes as well as intelligence work, disaster control and counter-terrorism. This constitutes a flagrant violation of, among other things, European privacy law. Efforts by individual citizens to challenge this through individual administrative court cases have thus far not yielded any results, since the administrative courts proved unwilling to evaluate the provision in question. Nevertheless, the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) has recently made a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice in
To that end we have today presented our Statement of Appeal to the Court of Appeal in The Hague. In this Statement Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm and Vita Zwaan (SOLV Attorneys) outline why Privacy First and co-plaintiffs have to be declared admissible. Subsequently, it will be possible for the Passport Act to be legally scrutinized in its entirety by the court and be measured up against higher law, including European privacy legislation. Our entire Statement of Appeal can be downloaded HERE (in Dutch). The Appeals Court of The Hague is expected to deliver its judgment before the summer.
Privacy First makes an urgent appeal to all Dutch citizens to contribute to the financing of this lawsuit. This can be done by donating on account number 126.96.36.1991 attn. Stichting Privacy First in
This afternoon the Privacy First Foundation sent the following email to the Dutch Senate:
Dear Members of the Senate,
Recently the international Amsterdam Privacy Conference 2012 took place. In his opening speech at this conference, Dutch politician Lodewijk Asscher principally addressed the current legislative proposal of regulating prostitution. Asscher voiced the expectation that the envisaged registration of prostitutes will lead to lawsuits that will end up before the European Court of Human Rights in
1. Compulsory registration of prostitutes will lead to a shift of prostitution to the illegal circuit. Thereby this legislative proposal will prove to be counterproductive, with all the risks this entails. The social (legal) status of prostitutes will become further weakened instead of strengthened.
2. Compulsory registration of prostitutes violates the right to privacy because it concerns the registration of sensitive personal information. This is prohibited under Article 16 of the Dutch Data Protection Act and is in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
3. Registration of prostitutes has a stigmatizing effect. Moreover, the security of this registration cannot possibly be guaranteed and there is also the danger of function creep. Therefore, the supposed advantages of registering do not outweigh the risks of data breaches, hacking, unauthorised and unforeseen use - now and in the future. This, in turn, also implies new risks of abuse and blackmailing.
4. Combating criminality and human trafficking ought not to happen through the risky registration of prostitutes, but rather through more effective criminal investigation, prosecution and adjudication of the culprits without putting the victims in danger. For that purpose it is up to the Minister to develop alternative, privacy-friendly instruments in consultation with relevant NGOs.
We are willing to supply further information on the above points upon request.
Privacy First Foundation
Update 30 October 2012: this afternoon the Senate heavily criticised (especially) the privacy aspects of compulsory registration of prostitutes. As a result, Minister Ivo Opstelten has decided to reconsider his approach to the issue. It now seems that compulsory registration is shelved. The discussion on other parts of the legislative proposal is postponed until further notice. Click HERE for an audio recording of the parliamentary debate (in Dutch) until its suspension (mp3, 2u53m, 119 MB).
The Privacy First Foundation has, with pleasure, just taken cognisance of 1) the announcement earlier today of a Dutch legislative proposal to abrogate fingerprints in ID cards and 2) the decision by the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) to make a request for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg on the legality and interpretation of the European Passport Regulation in four administrative cases of individual Dutch citizens. The Privacy First Foundation hereby makes an appeal to Dutch Parliament to adopt the legislative proposal to abrogate fingerprints in ID cards as soon as possible. In anticipation of the expected adoption of this legislative proposal, taking people's fingerprints for ID cards must be halted immediately or at least become voluntary as a temporary solution. Privacy First also hopes that the European Court of Justice will swiftly deal with the preliminary reference and conclude that taking fingerprints for passports and ID cards is unlawful because it violates the right to privacy. Further comments by Privacy First will follow.
Update 18.00h: listen to the interview (in Dutch) with Privacy First on Radio 1.
Update 29 September 2012: see also our reaction in the Dutch regional press.
On Thursday morning 23 August 2012, the Dutch Royal Military and Border Police (Koninklijke Nederlandse Marechaussee, KMAR) presented to the international press the by now notorious Dutch camera system called @migo-Boras. That same afternoon the Privacy First Foundation was visited in Amsterdam by a camera crew of international news agency Associated Press (AP). For copyright reasons unfortunately we cannot publish the video material from AP. Among other things, Vincent Böhre (Privacy First) declared the following to AP:
‘‘Our main concerns are about privacy, because this system is based on profiling and total surveillance of everybody driving on the highway. Our second objection is of course the Schengen Agreement: this system really comes down to border control, even though they don’t want to call it that way. But if you look at the capabilities of the system and the intentions behind it, it’s pretty clear that it comes down to border control, and that's also what most lawyers say.’’
The news report that was then distributed across the world by AP is set out below:
‘‘Amid privacy concerns, Dutch immigration minister shows off new border cameras targeting crime’
THE HAGUE, Netherlands (AP) — The Dutch immigration minister has shown off the government’s new system of cameras posted at border crossings with Germany and Belgium that he says will help clamp down on crimes like drug and people smuggling and illegal immigration.
However the new surveillance system has raised concerns among privacy activists.
The European Commission says that, based on information provided by Dutch authorities, the surveillance does not appear to breach the Schengen agreement governing freedom of movement within the 27-nation bloc and does not amount to a reintroduction of border controls.
However, the Commission says it will monitor the use of the cameras, which are posted at 15 highway border crossings. Immigration Minister Gerd Leers said Thursday the cameras are intended to help police target suspicious vehicles.’’
(Example: Montreal Gazette, via AP Worldstream)
Meanwhile, the Privacy First Foundation still considers taking legal action against @migo-Boras. It does so because 1) the system still has no specific legal basis, 2) the system is not necessary because it is solely 'supportive' to the task of the KMAR called Mobiel Toezicht Veiligheid (Mobile Security Monitoring) which is to check up on people from other Schengen countries travelling into the Netherlands, 3) the system is disproportionate because it is meant to track down a few individuals at the cost of the privacy and freedom to travel of everyone, 4) people are stopped and searched by the KMAR on the basis of the unlawful criterion of 'being interesting' instead of the lawful criterion of being under the 'reasonable suspicion of a criminal act', 5) the effectiveness of the system has thus far not been proved, 6) the system considers everyone at border crossings a potential suspect, 7) in practice, some elements of the system have a discriminatory effect, 8) the system seems increasingly set to be extended with four weeks of storage of everyone's travel movements through Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), 9) within the system design there is 'function creep (derogation from the original purpose) by design' instead of 'privacy by design' and 10) despite the judgement of the European Commission things basically come down to mass electronic border controls which are prohibited under the Schengen Agreement.
See also the following items (in Dutch, on privacyfirst.nl):
Big Brother-systeem zet privacy automobilist aan kant (Telegraaf.nl, 10 September 2012)
Interview met Privacy First over camerasysteem @migo-Boras (BNR Nieuwsradio, 1 August 2012)
Met @migo-Boras maak je geen vrienden (Privacy First, 5 January 2012)
Interview met Privacy First over nieuw grenscontrolesysteem @migo-boras (NOS Radio 1, 30 November 2011)
Interview met Privacy First over nieuw grenscontrolesysteem @migo-Boras (ZDF Journaal, 25 November 2011)
Click HERE for more items about @migo-Boras.