On Thursday 28 February 2013 there will be an important debate about the Dutch 'OV-chipkaart' (Public Transport chip card) in the Dutch House of Representatives (permanent commission for Infrastructure and Environment). In preparation of this debate the Privacy First Foundation today brought the following points to the attention of relevant Dutch Members of Parliament:  

  1. The 'anonymous' OV chip card is not anonymous because it contains a unique identification number in the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)-chip with which travellers can be identified and tracked afterwards through the linking of transaction data. In the view of Privacy First, this constitutes a violation of two human rights, namely the freedom of movement in conjunction with the right to privacy, in other words the classic right to travel freely and anonymously within one’s own country. Privacy First is eager to learn from the House of Representatives as well as the responsible member of government which steps have already been taken for the introduction of an anonymous OV chip card that is truly anonymous, for example through the development of new chip technology and modern forms of encryption without a unique identification number (privacy by design).
  2. As long as (truly) anonymous OV chip cards and anonymous discount cards do not exist, printed travel tickets are to remain available for travellers who want to travel anonymously. Moreover, a special, anonymous discount card for children and elderly people should also be introduced.
  3. Compulsory check-ins and check-outs for students carrying student OV chip cards contravenes with the right of students to travel freely and anonymously. Compulsory check-ins and check-outs therefore have to be abolished.
  4. The planned closure of turnstiles at Dutch National Railway stations (Nederlandse Spoorwegen, NS) constitutes an unnecessary restriction to people's freedom of movement and can lead to dangerous situations in the event of calamities. It also creates unsafe situations in individual cases, for example for children, elderly people, ill or incapacitated people who need to be accompanied through the station by family or friends. Therefore Privacy First makes an urgent appeal to leave the turnstiles open at all times or to get rid of them and replace them with anonymous check-in and check-out poles.
  5. The current retention period of OV chip card data should be reduced to an absolute minimum. Moreover, travellers should be offered the option to erase their travel history at any given moment.
  6. The OV chip card dramatically increases costs for travellers, either when purchasing a chip card, when forgetting to check out, in the event of a malfunctioning card or check-out pole or when deciding to travel anonymously with a printed ticket. Privacy First is eager to hear from the House of Representatives as well as the responsible government member which measures will be taken to make travelling with an OV chip card cheaper while preserving people's privacy.
Published in Mobility
Wednesday, 13 February 2013 15:33

Every motorist to become a potential suspect

The Dutch Ministry of Justice wants to track all motorists. The Privacy First Foundation is preparing for legal action.

Under a new, far-reaching legislative proposal, the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice Ivo Opstelten aims to enhance criminal investigation by introducing a four week storage period of the number plates of all cars through camera surveillance and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). Current rules dictate that these data have to be deleted within 24 hours. In 2010, the previous Dutch Minister of Justice (Hirsch Ballin) planned to make a similar proposal with a storage period of 10 days. However, the Dutch House of Representatives then declared this topic to be controversial. In his current proposal, Opstelten takes things a few steps further. Early 2010 the Dutch Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, CBP) ruled that police forces were not adhering to Dutch privacy rules by storing number plates for a greater period than was legally allowed. According to the CBP, all number plates that are not suspect (so-called ‘no hits’) are to be removed from relevant databases immediately. Opstelten’s plan to store the number plates of unsuspected citizens for four weeks directly flies in the face of this.

The Privacy First Foundation considers Opstelten’s legislative proposal to be a threat to society. ‘‘Under this measure every citizen becomes a potential suspect. You ought to trust the government, but it’s that very government that distrusts its own citizens’’, Privacy First chairman Bas Filippini declares. In a healthy democratic constitutional State the government should leave innocent citizens alone. Under this legislative proposal the government crosses that fundamental line. Collectively monitoring all motorists for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes is completely disproportionate and therefore unlawful.

In case Dutch Parliament adopts this legislative proposal, Privacy First will summon the Netherlands and have the legislative Act in question declared null and void on account of being in violation with the right to privacy. If needed, Privacy First and individual co-plaintiffs will be prepared to litigate all the way up to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. As of today, every citizen who is willing to participate in this lawsuit can register with Privacy First, stating ‘ANPR Trial’.

Published in CCTV

This week the Dutch House of Representatives will vote on a legislative proposal on the taking of 10 fingerprints of all foreigners (immigrants) for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes. This legislative proposal originally dates back to March 2009, the period in which all the Dutch government could come up with was privacy-intrusive legislation. The Privacy First Foundation deems this legislative proposal to be in breach of the right to privacy and the prohibition of self-incrimination. Below is the email that Privacy First sent to relevant Members of Parliament this afternoon:

Dear Members of Parliament,

Next Tuesday you will cast your vote on a legislative proposal aimed at extending the use of biometric features (fingerprints, facial scans) of immigrants. Hereby the Privacy First Foundation advises you to vote against this legislative proposal, especially in light of its disproportionate character. This disproportionality is demonstrated by the lack of relevant statistics and the relatively low fraud figures mentioned in the annotation to the legislative proposal dated 13 July 2012 by former Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Gerd Leers (Christian-democratic party CDA).[1] As with all human rights, any infringement of the right to privacy (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR) requires a concrete statistical necessity instead of vague suspicions and wishful thinking. Therefore, it is all the more worrying that under this legislative proposal the prints of as many as 10 fingers will be taken of every immigrant to ‘compensate’ for the fact that the biometric technology is inadequate to suffice with just one or two fingerprints. However, are these 10 fingerprints not actually meant to serve the interests of criminal investigation behind this legislative proposal...? In this respect, a comparison could be made with the following consideration by the Minister of Justice Benk Korthals (Dutch political party VVD), dated 10 December 2001:

‘‘In response to the question by the CDA, I am not prepared to proceed to the taking of fingerprints of all Dutch citizens in the interests of criminal investigation. This would be disproportionate, considering for example the number of print cases offered on an annual basis, in the whole of the Netherlands around 10,000. Furthermore, it is basically impracticable because prints have to be made of all ten fingers and possibly the hand palms for them to be of any use for criminal investigation. Apart from the administrative processing and control, this would require too big a drain on police resources. In the context of the new ID card, a new biometric feature such as a fingerprint will possibly be adopted. This will be about determining whether the holder of the ID card is in actual fact the very person that is mentioned on it. Perhaps just one fingerprint will be enough for that, but that is absolutely insufficient for criminal investigation.’’[2]

In other words: under the guise of combating fraud, with this legislative proposal a centralised search register of immigrants is created, exactly in the same way that this was about to happen a few years ago with the fingerprints of all Dutch citizens. Privacy First assumes that the various reasons why this last project was reversed midway through 2011 at the insistence of your Parliament (!) are known to you and apply just as much for the current legislative proposal. In addition, this proposal has a stigmatizing effect since it causes a whole population group (immigrants) to be seen as potential suspects. This creates an inversion of the presumption of innocence and conflicts with the prohibition of self-incrimination. In that sense the legislative proposal constitutes a collective violation of both Article 6 (nemo tenetur) and Article 8 ECHR (privacy and physical integrity). With regard to the Passport Act, this has led to a Dutch and European snowball effect of lawsuits since 2009. Therefore, Privacy First hopes that the House of Representatives has the progressive insight to prevent a repetition of this history.

Yours sincerely,

The Privacy First Foundation

[1] See Annotation on account of the report, Parliamentary Documents II, 2011-2012, 33192, no. 6, at 2-3, 5-6, 23, 25-27.

[2] Letter of the Minister of Justice (Benk Korthals) dated 10 december 2001, Parliamentary Documents II, 2001-2002, 19637 (Policy on refugees), no. 635, at 7.

Update 29 January 2013: the legislative proposal (no. 33192) has unfortunately been accepted by the House of Representatives this afternoon (video; starting at 19m36s). Dutch political parties D66, SP, ChristenUnie and the Party for the Animals voted against. Read also the report by Privacy Barometer and today’s article in newspaper NRC Handelsblad. Next stop: the Senate...

Update 29 January 2013, 21:45: Left-wing party GroenLinks ('GreenLeft') has notified that it had intended to vote against and will have the voting record corrected.

Update 30 January 2013: today GroenLinks notified the House of Representatives of its vote against the legislative proposal.

Update 31 January 2013: the article in NRC Handelsblad was also published in the affiliated newspaper NRC Next. Read also today's article in newspaper Nederlands Dagblad.

Update 8 February 2013: for the current status of the legislative proposal in the Dutch Senate, click HERE.

Update 6 March 2013: today Privacy First has sent a similar version of the email above to the Commission for Immigration and Asylum of the Dutch Senate.

Published in Law & Politics

In the context of a public consultation, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior recently requested Privacy First to react to the current government proposal to revise Article 13 of the Dutch Constitution (right to confidentiality of postal mail, telephone and telegraph). Below are our comments on the current draft of the legislative proposal (click HERE for the original Dutch version in pdf):

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Deputy Director for Constitutional Affairs and Legislation
Mr. W.J. Pedroli, LL.M.
PO Box 20011
2500 EA The Hague
The Netherlands

Amsterdam, 29 December 2012

Re: Comments by Privacy First on the revision of Article 13 of the Constitution

Dear Mr. Pedroli,

On October 16th 2012 you requested the Privacy First Foundation to react to the draft legislative proposal to revise Article 13 of our Constitution. Privacy First is grateful for your request and is happy to hereby provide you with critical comments. In the first place, Privacy First fully endorses the desire of this government to modernise the current, archaic Article 13 of the Constitution. However, Privacy First regrets the fact that the government has not seized the opportunity to also renew and reinforce other ‘fundamental rights in the digital age’.

Positive aspects
In the view of Privacy First, the first and third paragraphs of the current draft legislative proposal to revise Article 13 of the Constitution form powerful anchors for a future-proof right to confidential communication. The first paragraph rightly upgrades the old confidentiality of postal mail, telephone and telegraph to a technology-independent (or technology-neutral) confidentiality of mail and telecommunication. The third paragraph forms a correct guarantee for the horizontal effect thereof. Moreover, Privacy First endorses the broad interpretation that is being given by the draft Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to various relevant concepts. However, the second paragraph of the draft proposal contains a systematic imbalance which, in times less democratic, could endanger the rule of law in our society. It is precisely this paragraph which most of Privacy First’s criticism is focused upon. Other points of criticism concern compulsory notification towards citizens in the event that special powers have been used by the intelligence and security services, traffic data as well as the lack of a comparative legal section in the EM.      

Judicial authorisation and national security
The EM rightly states that "in light of Article 13 (...) the protection of citizens against violations by the government is paramount, especially in light of the actions by the police and intelligence services. Demanding a judicial authorisation under the Constitution provides a strong and clear constitutional guarantee."[1] It is therefore incomprehensible that in the second paragraph of the draft legislative proposal the domain of national security is being excluded from judicial supervision. After all, where the concentration of power is supreme, judicial checks and balances should be the most potent to prevent any (future) abuses of power. In light of European history, the exception in paragraph 2 is in fact entirely irresponsible: unfortunately, even in our part of the world a democratic constitutional State is not a static matter of fact. Apart from that, the current draft proposal sends out a dangerous signal to foreign governments. Furthermore, Privacy First deems the exception in paragraph 2 unwise in view of possible technological developments in the (far) future.[2] The same holds true in relation to the (further) expansion of the notion of ‘national security’. Also in the future, the Dutch population needs to be protected against arbitrary violations of confidentiality of communication; in this regard the current wording of paragraph 2 offers no guarantee whatsoever.

Adding an extra ‘judicial layer’ would strengthen the current system of internal and external supervision on the intelligence and security services (and hence reinforce our democratic constitutional State). In this regard, the system of judicial supervision in a country like Canada could be a source of inspiration. Such judicial control would also be in line with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights:

“The Court has indicated, when reviewing legislation governing secret surveillance in the light of Article 8 [ECHR], that in a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge.”[3]

In light hereof, the current wording of paragraph 2 is not expedient. Privacy First thus advises a revision of this paragraph as follows:

“This right can be restricted in cases defined by law with the authorisation of a judge or, in the interest of national security, with authorisation from one or more ministers appointed by law.’’ [lining through by Privacy First]


As a possible alternative to the introduction of judicial supervision in the security domain, Privacy First advises to upgrade the existing Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) into a more powerful, independent supervisory body, similar to the Belgian or German model with overall compulsory inspections beforehand instead of random supervisory inspections afterwards.

Compulsory notification
A second point of criticism concerns the lack of an explicit constitutional notion of compulsory notification in the event of any infringement of the confidentiality of mail and telecommunication. Compulsory notification provides legal protection to citizens and contributes to the correct enforcement of law by the government, also in the security domain. Like judicial authorisation, this offers the best guarantuees against short-term as well as long-term violations.

Traffic data
From Privacy First's point of view, traffic data too need to fall within the scope of Article 13 of the Constitution. These data are often related to the content of communication; this even follows from the text of the EM itself, where text messages ('SMS') and the email subject line are rightly mentioned as examples. The same goes for instance for search terms in search engines. Apart from that, it is possible to deduce the content of communication between individuals and/or companies from traffic data in conjunction with other data (possibly collected in real-time). So here too, a vigorous regime of Article 13 of the Constitution in conjunction with judicial supervision is essential.

Comparative law
Finally, in the current EM Privacy First misses a comparative legal paragraph in which current Article 13 of the Constitution is compared with constitutional best practices from countries with either a civil law or a common law tradition. Additionally, with a new Article 13 of the Constitution that is state-of-the-art internationally, the Netherlands could positively distinguish itself and to some degree regain its former position as a leader in human rights.

Privacy First hopes that this advice will be of use to you. We are willing to give clarifications on the above points upon request.

Yours sincerely,

Privacy First Foundation

Vincent Böhre
Director of Operations

[1] EM, at 18, 20.

[2] Compare EM at 11, 1st paragraph.

[3] ECHR 22 November 2012, Telegraaf vs. Netherlands (Appl.no. 39315/06), para. 98. Compare also ibid., paras. 98-102.

[4] EM, at 18.

Update 8 February 2013: see also the critical comments by the Netherlands Committee of Jurists for Human Rights (NJCM), Bits of Freedom and the newly established Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (in Dutch).

Published in Law & Politics

The appeal by Privacy First and 19 citizens against the Dutch government takes place today. Privacy First is of the opinion that the new Dutch Passport Act violates the right to privacy. Despite criticism from the Dutch House of Representatives, the Dutch government recently decided to push this controversial law ahead. The case of Privacy First primarily concentrates on the centralised storage of fingerprints. This lawsuit is the first of its kind.

Clarification
On February 2, 2011, the Privacy First Foundation and 21 co-plaintiffs (citizens) were declared inadmissible by the district court of The Hague in our civil case against the Netherlands regarding the 2009 Dutch Passport Act. A proposal by the Dutch Minister of the Interior, Ms. Liesbeth Spies, to revise the Passport Act has been presented to the House of Representatives on 17 October this year. However, in this legislative proposal the original provision (Article 4b) concerning a centralised database remains intact for the greater part. Under this provision, biometric data of every Dutch citizen will be used for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes as well as intelligence work, disaster control and counter-terrorism. This constitutes a flagrant violation of, among other things, European privacy law. Efforts by individual citizens to challenge this through individual administrative court cases have thus far not yielded any results, since the administrative courts proved unwilling to evaluate the provision in question. Nevertheless, the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) has recently made a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg regarding the European Passport Regulation. In anticipation of the Court’s response, all Dutch administrative proceedings have been put on hold for at least one and a half years, which means that protesting citizens have to fend for themselves during that period without valid identity documents. Enough reason for Privacy First to again haul up the civil-law sails in the public interest and to appeal in our Passport Act lawsuit.

To that end we have today presented our Statement of Appeal to the Court of Appeal in The Hague. In this Statement Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm and Vita Zwaan (SOLV Attorneys) outline why Privacy First and co-plaintiffs have to be declared admissible. Subsequently, it will be possible for the Passport Act to be legally scrutinized in its entirety by the court and be measured up against higher law, including European privacy legislation. Our entire Statement of Appeal can be downloaded HERE (in Dutch). The Appeals Court of The Hague is expected to deliver its judgment before the summer.

Urgent appeal
Privacy First makes an urgent appeal to all Dutch citizens to contribute to the financing of this lawsuit. This can be done by donating on account number 49.55.27.521 attn. Stichting Privacy First in Amsterdam, mentioning the following reference: ‘Paspoortproces’. We kindly thank you for your support!

Published in Litigation

This afternoon the Privacy First Foundation sent the following email to the Dutch Senate: 

Dear Members of the Senate,

Recently the international Amsterdam Privacy Conference 2012 took place. In his opening speech at this conference, Dutch politician Lodewijk Asscher principally addressed the current legislative proposal of regulating prostitution. Asscher voiced the expectation that the envisaged registration of prostitutes will lead to lawsuits that will end up before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Privacy First Foundation shares this expectation. Therefore, we hereby make an urgent appeal to you not to let things get this far and to reject the legislative proposal during the plenary discussion this coming Tuesday, October 30th. Privacy First does so on the following grounds:

1. Compulsory registration of prostitutes will lead to a shift of prostitution to the illegal circuit. Thereby this legislative proposal will prove to be counterproductive, with all the risks this entails. The social (legal) status of prostitutes will become further weakened instead of strengthened.
2. Compulsory registration of prostitutes violates the right to privacy because it concerns the registration of sensitive personal information. This is prohibited under Article 16 of the
Dutch Data Protection Act and is in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
3. Registration of prostitutes has a stigmatizing effect. Moreover, the security of this registration cannot possibly be guaranteed and there is also the danger of function creep. Therefore, the supposed advantages of registering do not outweigh the risks of data breaches, hacking, unauthorised and unforeseen use - now and in the future. This, in turn, also implies new risks of abuse and blackmailing.  
4. Combating criminality and human trafficking ought not to happen through the risky registration of prostitutes, but rather through more effective criminal investigation, prosecution and adjudication of the culprits without putting the victims in danger. For that purpose it is up to the Minister to develop alternative, privacy-friendly instruments in consultation with relevant NGOs.

We are willing to supply further information on the above points upon request.

Yours sincerely,

Privacy First Foundation

Update 30 October 2012: this afternoon the Senate heavily criticised (especially) the privacy aspects of compulsory registration of prostitutes. As a result, Minister Ivo Opstelten has decided to reconsider his approach to the issue. It now seems that compulsory registration is shelved. The discussion on other parts of the legislative proposal is postponed until further notice. Click HERE for an audio recording of the parliamentary debate (in Dutch) until its suspension (mp3, 2u53m, 119 MB).

Published in Law & Politics

The Privacy First Foundation has, with pleasure, just taken cognisance of 1) the announcement earlier today of a Dutch legislative proposal to abrogate fingerprints in ID cards and 2) the decision by the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) to make a request for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg on the legality and interpretation of the European Passport Regulation in four administrative cases of individual Dutch citizens. The Privacy First Foundation hereby makes an appeal to Dutch Parliament to adopt the legislative proposal to abrogate fingerprints in ID cards as soon as possible. In anticipation of the expected adoption of this legislative proposal, taking people's fingerprints for ID cards must be halted immediately or at least become voluntary as a temporary solution. Privacy First also hopes that the European Court of Justice will swiftly deal with the preliminary reference and conclude that taking fingerprints for passports and ID cards is unlawful because it violates the right to privacy. Further comments by Privacy First will follow.    

Update 18.00h: listen to the interview (in Dutch) with Privacy First on Radio 1.

Update 29 September 2012: see also our reaction in the Dutch regional press.

Published in Biometrics

On Thursday morning 23 August 2012, the Dutch Royal Military and Border Police (Koninklijke Nederlandse Marechaussee, KMAR) presented to the international press the by now notorious Dutch camera system called @migo-Boras. That same afternoon the Privacy First Foundation was visited in Amsterdam by a camera crew of international news agency Associated Press (AP). For copyright reasons unfortunately we cannot publish the video material from AP. Among other things, Vincent Böhre (Privacy First) declared the following to AP:

‘‘Our main concerns are about privacy, because this system is based on profiling and total surveillance of everybody driving on the highway. Our second objection is of course the Schengen Agreement: this system really comes down to border control, even though they don’t want to call it that way. But if you look at the capabilities of the system and the intentions behind it, it’s pretty clear that it comes down to border control, and that's also what most lawyers say.’’

The news report that was then distributed across the world by AP is set out below:

‘‘Amid privacy concerns, Dutch immigration minister shows off new border cameras targeting crime’

THE HAGUE, Netherlands (AP) — The Dutch immigration minister has shown off the government’s new system of cameras posted at border crossings with Germany and Belgium that he says will help clamp down on crimes like drug and people smuggling and illegal immigration.

However the new surveillance system has raised concerns among privacy activists.

The European Commission says that, based on information provided by Dutch authorities, the surveillance does not appear to breach the Schengen agreement governing freedom of movement within the 27-nation bloc and does not amount to a reintroduction of border controls.

However, the Commission says it will monitor the use of the cameras, which are posted at 15 highway border crossings. Immigration Minister Gerd Leers said Thursday the cameras are intended to help police target suspicious vehicles.’’
(Example: Montreal Gazette, via AP Worldstream)

Meanwhile, the Privacy First Foundation still considers taking legal action against @migo-Boras. It does so because 1) the system still has no specific legal basis, 2) the system is not necessary because it is solely 'supportive' to the task of the KMAR called Mobiel Toezicht Veiligheid (Mobile Security Monitoring) which is to check up on people from other Schengen countries travelling into the Netherlands, 3) the system is disproportionate because it is meant to track down a few individuals at the cost of the privacy and freedom to travel of everyone, 4) people are stopped and searched by the KMAR on the basis of the unlawful criterion of 'being interesting' instead of the lawful criterion of being under the 'reasonable suspicion of a criminal act', 5) the effectiveness of the system has thus far not been proved, 6) the system considers everyone at border crossings a potential suspect, 7) in practice, some elements of the system have a discriminatory effect, 8) the system seems increasingly set to be extended with four weeks of storage of everyone's travel movements through Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), 9) within the system design there is 'function creep (derogation from the original purpose) by design' instead of 'privacy by design' and 10) despite the judgement of the European Commission things basically come down to mass electronic border controls which are prohibited under the Schengen Agreement.

See also the following items (in Dutch, on privacyfirst.nl):

Big Brother-systeem zet privacy automobilist aan kant (Telegraaf.nl, 10 September 2012)

Interview met Privacy First over camerasysteem @migo-Boras (BNR Nieuwsradio, 1 August 2012)

Met @migo-Boras maak je geen vrienden (Privacy First, 5 January 2012)

Interview met Privacy First over nieuw grenscontrolesysteem @migo-boras (NOS Radio 1, 30 November 2011)

Interview met Privacy First over nieuw grenscontrolesysteem @migo-Boras (ZDF Journaal, 25 November 2011)

Click HERE for more items about @migo-Boras.

Published in CCTV
Wednesday, 27 June 2012 13:58

No bodyscans on the streets!

The Amsterdam police are considering the introduction of mobile X-ray body scanners on the streets, local television station AT5 reported today. If the police will indeed introduce such "nude scanners", Privacy First will not hesitate to sue both the Amsterdam police and the responsible Amsterdam Mayor Van der Laan for breach of 1) human dignity, 2) the presumption of innocence, 3) privacy, 4) freedom of movement, 5) physical integrity and 6) the health of all Amsterdam residents. Any introduction of mobile X-ray scanners will actively jeopardize the privacy as well as the health of innocent citizens.

Privacy First hereby makes an urgent appeal for political measures: this Thursday the subject of preventive searches is on the agenda of the Amsterdam city council. It is primarily up to the council to blow the whistle and prohibit the introduction of nude scanners by the Amsterdam police. If the council fails in this, Privacy First reserves the right to take all necessary measures to prevent the introduction of nude scanners.

Update 7.00pm: reaction of Privacy First on FunX Radio (in Dutch).

Update June 29, 2012: the introduction of mobile body scanners is put on hold during further investigations by Amsterdam Mayor Van der Laan. The subject will not be on the agenda of the Amsterdam city council again until early 2013. The political debate on preventive searches (including the possible introduction of body scanners) which took place yesterday in the Amsterdam city council Committee for General Affairs can be viewed online HERE (starting at 233m40s).

Published in CCTV

This Tuesday afternoon it is expected that the Dutch House of Representatives will vote in favour of two important motions. The first motion urges the Dutch government to have the European Passport Regulation critically discussed in Brussels. The second motion appeals to the government to take a firm stand in Brussels for there to be a critical reaction to American extraterritorial legislation, such as the notorious US Patriot Act. Both motions have come into being partly as a result of earlier reports by Privacy First about 1) the futility of taking fingerprints for passports and ID-cards and 2) the risk of Dutch fingerprints secretly ending up in foreign hands.  

The current taking of fingerprints is the result of the European Passport Regulation. This regulation dates back to the end of 2004 and primarily came into existence under pressure of the American Bush administration. Back then there was hardly any critical discussion about the benefits and necessity of taking people's fingerprints for travel documents. At the time the responsible rapporteur of the European Parliament wasn’t even able to bring out into the open statistics about this matter, as was recently revealed through a FOIA-request filed by Privacy First. Soon it will be up to the European Commission to still prove the effectiveness of the Passport Regulation. In case the Commission fails in doing so, the Regulation should be discarded immediately.

Apart from fingerprints, the long arm of the Bush administration has for years been reaching deep into the heart of Europe. With the American Patriot Act in force, the US government acquired, among other things, the power to obtain information from European companies that are situated in America as well. But this piece of legal imperialism was nothing new for the Americans: in the American 'war on drugs', American powers have been reaching far across US land and sea borders for decades. Since 2001, the Patriot Act has extended this extraterritorial circus to the American 'war on terror'. The 2002 The Hague Invasion Act has the same colonial touch to it: under this law the American administration reserves the right to keep Americans out of the hands of the International Criminal Court, if needed by invading The Hague. Another, more recent example is the National Defence Authorization Act: this law provides the US army with the power to arrest 'terror suspects' anywhere in the world and put them in military detention without any form of due process for an unlimited period of time.

In recent years Washington has hardly cared about the jurisdiction of other countries and international law. It has been generally known that in the long run this could only lead to excesses. Therefore it’s an absolute mystery to Privacy First what led the Dutch government to extend the contracts with the French passport manufacturer Morpho (partially situated in the US) without the guarantee that the fingerprints of Dutch citizens could not end up in American (or other foreign) hands. It is now up to the Dutch government to still protect its citizens and to request the European Commission to do the same thing at the European level.

Update: Both motions have been adopted by the House of Representatives with an overwhelming majority! You can find a video of it HERE (in Dutch, starting at 9m55s). Only the right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) rejected the motions.

Published in Law & Politics
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